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Abstract
This article focuses on the different manner in which antidiscrimination 
regimes treat groups that have been discriminated-against de jure and de 
facto. This Article approaches the prerequisite of antidiscrimination laws 
that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a manner that 
diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely 
destructive force. The central argument is that the way in which de jure, 
overt and blatant discrimination necessarily must create a coherent group 
identity recognized by law allows groups that are discriminated against in 
this manner to obtain remedial relief, whereas the law fails to recognize a 
coherent group identity for de facto discriminated-against groups and thus 
these groups have to overcome a structural challenge to obtain remedial 
relief to counter the discrimination. Thus, strangely, groups that are 
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are 
discriminated against only de facto once one considers both the 
discriminatory and the remedial phases. After establishing the de jure/de 
facto distinction, the article explores the effects of this distinction on the 
equal protection claims of discriminated-against groups by contrasting the 
experiences of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans.
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3“State power has made a significant difference
– sometimes between life and death –
 in the efforts of Black people to transform their world” 1
Introduction
Imagine discrimination as an advantageous stratagem – unimaginable? Not 
necessarily. This Article suggests that formal, overt, blatant discrimination in an early, 
discriminating stage could be helpful by enabling a discriminated group to establish 
itself, creating group recognition, and positioning the group as eligible for 
antidiscrimination relief at a later, remedial stage.   
Antidiscrimination laws are one of the most significant areas where the law 
recognizes and seeks to redress suffering and injustice. They allow formerly 
discriminated against groups to utilize the legal system to redistribute social power 
through variety of remedies. This Article approaches the prerequisite of 
antidiscrimination laws that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a 
manner that diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely 
destructive force. In contrast, this Article argues that discrimination can be a positive 
force inasmuch as it provides legal recognition for a discriminated against group. In 
other words, sometimes legal discrimination can make a group better off than it 
otherwise would be by creating a group cohesiveness that the group can later use to 
access powerful legal remedies against past wrongs.
This Article advances a novel argument re-evaluating discriminatory legal 
rules as also having potentially important constructive, constitutive value for groups. 
This notion does not mean that discrimination is good. Rather, the argument is that a 
specific form of discrimination, namely de jure discrimination, not only negatively 
influences the well-being of the group that is discriminated against, it also has indirect 
positive effects on the well-being of the group later on by improving that group's 
ability to access the legal system to fight against this discrimination. Additionally, the 
Article suggests that in addition to influencing the well-being of the de jure
discriminated group, de jure discrimination also indirectly influences groups that 
1 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination  Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,1382 (1988). 
4mainly suffer from another form of discrimination, namely de facto discrimination. 
The latter category of groups will often lack the ability to access the legal system that 
the former category of groups generally has. Thus, strangely, groups that are 
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated 
against only de facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial 
phases. The reason for this paradox is simple: it is easier to fight legal battles for 
group remedy when a group has already been identified as the "outlawed" and is 
asking to be “inlawed”. In doctrinal terms, this Article's argument is apparent in the 
prerequisite of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that one should be 
discriminated against due to one’s membership in a recognizable, distinct group. 
Groups that suffer from de facto discrimination, as opposed to de jure discrimination, 
face structural barriers in fulfilling this requirement.
The hypothesis in this Article is that de jure ddiscriminatoin has important 
effects. De jure discrimination perpetuates the identity of the discriminated group, it 
increases the sense of "realness" of the discrimination-based suffering, and it 
vindicates the group's need for and entitlement to legal redress. To put in other>your 
decision?> terms, although groups suffering from de jure discrimination were brutally 
excluded from society by the law, they were, at the same time, included in society's 
primer legal text, received "visibility" (albeit notorious visibility), and were 
constituted as a legal entity (albeit as a discriminated-against group). These effects 
become evident through what this Article calls the "streaming from de jure
discrimination paradigm," a phenomenon in which a group's struggle to become 
recognized by law as a discriminated-against entity that is entitled to legal remedy is 
reinforced when that discrimination is de jure. In other words, a group being de jure
discriminated against at an early stage, which this Article designates the 
"discriminating stage," dramatically increases that group's prospects of recognition as 
a "legally discriminated group" that enjoys the right to obtain antidiscrimination relief 
during the later, "curing stage".2 This understanding of the interaction between de jure
discrimination and legal relief demonstrates that the past existence of de jure 
discrimination is a key factor in determining the quality and quantity of the legal relief 
2 The stage of commitment to the “antidiscrimination principle” begun gradually after the Civil War 
and during the Reconstruction, but is much more evident, coherent, and holistic since the mid-20th 
century. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976). Kimberle Crenshaw marks the abolishment of the Jim Crow legal 
system as the crucial point of transition into the “formal equality” era. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377.
5later available to the group and is a key factor in determining how difficult it is for the 
group to obtain such relief. This Article challenges the justness of the current 
"streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm" and instead proposes an alternative 
approach that is more sensitive to different modes of discrimination and thus more 
effective at fighting both substantive and formal discrimination, whether that 
discrimination is de facto or de jure.
This Article's analysis is relevant to any regime in which at the first stage 
dichotomous de jure and de facto discriminatory practices exist simultaneously and in 
which at the second stage antidiscrimination laws are used to remedy the past 
discrimination.4 In the discrimination stage, all groups are subject to de facto
discrimination, while only some of them are also explicitly subject to de jure
discrimination. Although the theoretical application of the Article is more general, to 
demonstrate its implications, the Article concentrates<needs a proposition?> two real 
world examples, first the contrasting American experiences of African- and Mexican 
Americans and second the Israeli experience with Mizrahi-Jews and Arab-
Palestinians. The divergent experiences of these groups represent the different 
remedial treatment available to groups along the scale form de jure to de facto 
discrimination and help illustrate the implications of this Article's approach. 
African-Americans are the most prominent group to suffer from de jure
discrimination and represent the way in which "the streaming from de jure 
discrimation paradigm" creates a legally cognizable discriminated-against group. This 
group was the main target of America's de jure discrimination, both slavery and the 
Jim Crow, state-sponsored, constitutionally protected system of racial discrimination 
that took place after the abolition of slavery from 1890 through the mid-twentieth 
century.5 Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, do not fit into the de jure paradigm 
and demonstrate why the typical "streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm" 
needs to be revised. Mexican-Americans are considered America's "forgotten 
minority"; indeed, their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile even in 
the present day.6 Mexican-Americans did not explicitly fall under any of America's de 
4My argument is limited to racial discrimination since it is the hardest category to identify and 
determine, as opposed to gender-based groups or the group of the disabled, for example.  
5 On the Jim Crow legal system of segregation see F. James Davis, Who is Black? 51-70 (1991). On 
the constitutionality of slavery see Constitutional Law 422-431 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al., 4th ed., 2001).
6jure discriminatory practices during the Jim Crow era, despite the fact that Mexican-
Americans were a substantial minority group at the time.7 However, although they did 
not suffer from de jure discrimination, Mexican-Americans did suffer from 
discriminatory practices such as chronic abuse and segregation.8 This discrimination 
was quite similar to that suffered by groups suffering from de jure discrimination,9
except that the discrimination against Mexican-Americans did not primarily occur 
through the use of the formal legal system. To date, despite being the largest minority 
group in American today,10 Mexican-Americans remain largely invisible in the 
American antidiscrimination discourse.11
The dominant position of African-Americans over Mexican Americans in the 
antidiscrimination discourse has been widely discussed.12  This Article sheds new 
light on this discussion and suggests that the difference between the two groups 
6 Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under Rule 23 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 393 (1975) (arguing though that a huge 
change has occured with Mexican-American identity); Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Sonia R. Garcia, 
Henry Flores & Jose Roberto Juarez Jr, Mexican Americans & the Law 16 (2004) [hereinafter: 
Mexican Americans & the Law].
7 The survey was conducted in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the southern 
states in which most Mexican-Americans resided. See Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Mexican 
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 662, 680 (1975).
8 For a brief history of Mexican-American encounters with the law see Mexican Americans & the Law, 
supra note 6, at 4-10.
9 Greenfield & Kates, supra note 7, at 687.
10 U.S. Census figures identify Latinos as "the largest minority group in the U.S.” See Margaret E. 
Montoya, A Brief History of Chicana/o School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12 
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 159, 162 (2000-01).
11 Eduardo Luna, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and 
Discrimination Against Them Invisible, 14 La Raza L. Jour 225 (2003) (suggesting that Mexican-
Americans have not suffered from discrimination or that they never resisted it). 
12 See generally, Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit 
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1596 (1997) (determining a black 
exceptionalism to other discriminated groups in America); Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and 
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (1992) 16 (considers the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence as tailored to African-Americans’ experience). For a contrary position, 
see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American 
Racial Thought, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1219 (1997). Courts do not necessarily uphold the paradigm. See 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(suggesting that “…the Mexican-Americans residing in this district have experienced deprivations and 
discriminations similar to those suffered by the district's Negroes, and they share with the Negro the 
special problems involved in overcoming existing divisive conditions and the stigma and disadvantage 
that have accompanied their segregation”). Other scholarship contends that the current socioeconomic 
status of Mexican Americans is even worse than that of African-Americans. See Luna, supra note 11, 
at 229. The 2000 United States Census reveals that Latinos currently comprise the largest minority 
group and suffer from greater segregation than African-Americans. See Montoya, supra note 10, at 
162. On the shared conceptual prejudice against both groups see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory (2001) 76-74.
7represents also the different forms of discrimination suffered by them. Although one
may consider it fairly obvious that different types of discrimination lead to different 
treatment in the discrimination discourse, this specific difference between the groups-
- where African-Americans have enjoyed full recognition as a discriminated-against 
group while Mexican-Americans have not--nonetheless demands further inquiry. 
Another example of this de jure/de facto distinction is found in Israel. On one 
hand, Israel has a well-developed antidiscrimination jurisprudence and the right for 
equality is guaranteed to all its citizens.13 On the other hand, due to Israel's Jewish 
foundations, de jure discrimination against non-Jews still exists with the primary goal 
of  maintaining Israel’s Jewish majority.14 Within this legal framework, the 
recognition of the de jure discriminated groups and the non-recognition of the de 
facto ones is extremely apparent. The Mizrahis, a group of Jews of Arab descent, are a 
legally unrecognized group that suffers from lingering de facto discrimination. Unlike 
Mexican-Americans, Mizrahis are largely absent from the Israeli discrimination 
discourse. This absence is better understood when compared to the social and legal 
position of the Arab-Israelis group, which is the prototypical discriminated-against 
“other” in the Israeli context. Unlike African-Americans, where America’s legal 
colorblindness replaced past de jure discrimination, Israel's law with regard to Arab-
Israelis simultaneously exists in both the remedying and discriminating stages. As a 
result, their Arab-Israelis' status as the main target of de jure discrimination has, in a 
paradoxical way, positioned them to be the main recipients of antidiscrimination relief 
in areas where discrimination against them cannot be justified as defending the Jewish 
character of Israel.15 This state of affairs affects the Israeli courts' judgments about the 
position of Mizrahis and makes the de facto discrimination that the Mizrahis suffer 
more invisible and legally unrecognizable.  
13 The right of equality for all has been adopted by the Supreme Court as the heart of both Israel’s 
constitutional and administrative laws. For Israel’s unique manner of protecting human rights through 
the judiciary see Aron Barak, Constitutional Law without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary, in
The Role of Courts in Society 448 (S. Shetreet ed., 1988). 
14
 For the delicate status of Arabs in Israel as citizens and simultaenously de jure and de facto 
discriminated-against minority see generally, David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel 
(1990). For the various forms of discrimination against Arab-Israelis see id, at 89-134.
15
 See Chaim Gans, The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of Zionism, 5 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 269 (2004); Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medina, The Constitutional Law of Israel: 
Fundamental Principles 463-466 (6th ed., 2005).
8Methodologically, this Article focuses on litigation over segregation, primarily 
in education, as the way in which these different groups engage in the discrimination 
discourse. It traces the various ways in which segregation litigation has contributed to 
producing the legal recognition of groups that suffered de jure segregation as opposed 
to the way it has shaped (or failed to shape) the legal recognition of groups that 
suffered primarily from de facto segregation. The former have come to be recognized 
as strong, cohesive groups, whereas the latter have acquired at best a fragile group 
recognition. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the Article's analysis at the 
juncture of the forms of discrimination and equal protection analyses as they relates to 
other proximate analyses. Part II explores the advantages of de jure discrimination, 
namely that it creates legally cognizable groups and thereby enhances the ability of 
that group to obtain de jure relief. Parts III and IV describe the ways in which the 
current rights discourse misses the process by which groups that suffer from de facto
discrimination seek to achieve de jure relief. The focus in these parts is on the ways in 
which American and Israeli courts, dealing with segregation litigation in education, 
have failed to apply antidiscrimination law paradigms to groups that have typically 
suffered from de facto discrimination. Part V argues for the greater use of contextual 
tools in applying antidiscrimination rules to de facto discrimination. Courts should be 
more attentive to the full legal history of a group pleading discrimination and the lack 
de jure discrimination against a group should not necessarily limit the legal 
recognition that group should receive during the remedial stage. 
Part I: Location, Location
This article’s argument is located at the intersection of the anti-discrimination and 
epistemological discourses and challenges the traditional conception of the ways in 
which these discourses intersect. This part discusses the different ways in which the 
discourses intersect and how this Article's argument affects them.
1) The De jure – De facto Distinction discourse
What makes an act “de jure” and thus makes it eligible for judicial review? Is 
a single, concrete decision by a low hierarchy official as to whether an action is de 
jure under a federal statute? Over time, the distinction between de jure and de facto
has been progressively blurred, and sometimes this distinction signifies little more 
than a legal conclusion. This ephemeral distinction has been criticized as having an 
9elusive, false jurisprudential effect, enabling court to draw a thin, manipulable line 
between de facto and de jure acts.16 Though fully aware of this criticism and 
supportive of it, this Article still argues that at some level the distinction matters; 
specifically,  the distinction matters to the way in which groups discriminated against 
in different ways perceive themselves politically and to the way in which those groups 
are perceived by others. This Article employs the distinction consciously in its 
extreme technical sense in order to make this theoretical point. Using the phrase de 
jure discrimination, I have in mind a most materialistic, formal meaning, namely 
discrimination that is effected by overt, explicit, and systematic laws and regulations. 
De facto actions of discrimination, on the other hand, result from actions that are 
covert and that are less or not formalized in primer legal texts. These two poles of 
discrimination, nonetheless, are located along a continuum, in which the more 
resemblance the type of discrimination being complained of bears to one of the poles, 
the more direct the argument made in this Article applies.
Discussion of the role of the de jure/de facto distinction in the current 
discrimination analysis has been somewhat meager and one-dimensional. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action, and thus 
only counters de jure discrimination. This truth has profoundly limited courts' power 
to confront non-de jure discriminatory actions. Since they occurred with little if any 
legal record, de facto discriminatory practices were more difficult to track than de jure
discriminatory practices. Particularly in the struggle for desegregation in education, 
artificial and blurred lines were drawn between largely similar discriminating acts by 
public authorities.17 These arbitrary lines had a devastating effect on the struggle of de 
facto discriminated against groups to overcome such discrimination.18 In many cases, 
courts refused to provide relief for complaints made about segregating practices on 
16 For a challenge of this distinction in order to demonstrate a de jure discrimination that allows for de 
jure relief see "De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools" 7 Har. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. LR 307 
(1972) (challenging the denial of de jure discriminated-against status for Chicanos in Texas).
17 See, for example, the opinions of Justices Douglas and Powell in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
Denver, CO, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), in which they clarified that any discrimination administered by a 
state agency, regardless of its informal basis, as in the case of a discriminatory unwritten policy and 
discriminatory decisions by officals, is a state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to 
the Board of Education's acts presented as "de facto discrimination," Justice Douglas declared that 
"each is but another form of de jure discrimination" and suggests there should be no constitutional 
implications to the distinction once the force of law is placed behind the defendants. Ibid, at p.216.
18 Id, at 218-19. Justice Powell suggested abandoning it in favor of adopting a broader conception of 
constitutional justice. See Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 6, at 27-28
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the grounds that those practices were not de jure and thus did not provide grounds for 
judicial intervention.19
The traditional critique of the distinction between de jure and de facto 
discrimination is different than the one this Article stresses. The traditional critique's 
main goal is to facilitate a re-conceptualization of de jure acts to include acts that are 
currently perceived as de facto ones with the eventual end goal of dismantling the 
distinction.20 This Article, rather, stresses that the distinction, though largely 
unjustified, has yet some meaningful effects that have been so far ignored in the 
attempts to normatively abolish the distinction. This Article proposes a 
phenomenological insight on the systematic effects that the divergent forms of 
discrimination have in creating "legally cognized discriminated groups".
2) The Judicial Protection of Minorities Discourse 
The de jure/de facto distinction’s critique is significant to scholarship on the 
justification for having judicial review that favors discriminated-against groups.21 In 
his article on the judiciary’s legitimate role in protecting minority rights, Bruce 
Ackerman used an interest-group analysis to reorient the doctrine of judicial 
intervention in minority rights.22 Ackerman pointed out the misconceptions embedded 
in the Supreme Court's standard "discrete and insular" definition for determining 
which groups are entitled to judicial protection through the Equal Protection Clause.23
He specifically argues that the Court has failed  to evaluate the real need for judicial 
intervention on behalf of "anonymous and defused" minorities; Ackerman argues that 
these groups need protection since they are typically less politically empowered  than 
the "discrete and insular" minorities. The argument here follows Ackerman's and, to 
some extent, criticizes it as ignoring worsened groups in need for judiciary protection, 
namely, minorities which are "anonymous, defused and legally absent".
Although Ackerman's argument focuses on the separation of powers and the 
judiciary's power to nullify discriminatory statutes, it also suggests a broader, 
19 See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American 
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 555, 586-603 (1994) (presenting the various 
petitions declined on this basis).
20 See Cisneros, supra note 12, at 617-18 (reconceptualizating the facts as de jure acts). For a 
comprehensive example of such a project, see Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala (Project Report), 
De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. L. Rev. 307 (1972). 
21 Developments in the Law – Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1125 (1968-1969).
22 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
23 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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enduring role for the judiciary with regard to protecting minorities.24 Ackerman's 
analysis presupposes a viable legal recognition of the minority group, since he targets 
the anti-democratic nature of the de jure discrimination from which that group suffers. 
His basic idea is that the less politically effective a discriminated against group is, the 
more courts are democratically empowered to operate to protect that group. In the 
case of legally absent minorities, this political weakness is especially pronounced. For 
example, these minorities lack the "visibility" necessary for the political system to 
recognize their suffering or to enable them to accumulate political power. This Article 
argues that these features are heavily influenced by whether a group is discriminated 
against de jure or de facto, stressing the need for a  reconsideration of how we define 
what a minority group is for remedial purposes.
3) The Equal Protection Discourse 
Recognition of a group is a prerequisite to that group asserting an Equal 
Protection Claim. But the group recognition this Article is concerned with is not the 
commonly discussed nature of the group that is relevant to what level of judicial 
review applies to laws affecting that group.25 Rather, the concept of group recognition 
in this Article is unconcerned with what level of judicial review will apply, since a 
group’s desire to be classified as a “suspect category” to receive the highest level of 
judicial protection is not a struggle to be recognized as a group. For example, laws 
discriminating against women are subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny than 
African-Americans, yet women are the clearest legally cognizable group. 
The type of group recognition this Article is concerned with is the requirement 
under the Equal Protection Clause that any group challenging a discriminatory act 
have enough distinctiveness so as to have standing to raise the discrimination claim.26
This requirement under the Equal Protection Clause, although rarely discussed, is 
crucial in pleading a constitutional violation: “the first step is to establish that the 
group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment 
under the laws, as written or as applied”.27 The Equal Protection Clause, thus 
incorporates a group-based ideology even while maintaining the individualistic nature 
24 Id, at 715. 
25 See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685-692 (7th ed., 2004).
26 This prerequisite is different from the “standing doctrine” requisite embedded in Article III of the 
Constitution. See Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, Questions 1507-1518 (Jesse H. Choper et al., 
9th ed., 2001).
27 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-
479.
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of claims.28 That is, one being part of a group--and the sameness one shares with that 
group--is necessary as a foundation for any individual allegation of discrimination. In 
this context, the lack of legal recognition as a group that is evident in de facto 
discriminated against groups like Mexican-Americans, means that these groups have 
only a fragile, partial, and hesitant recognition. This limited recognition means that in 
order to win an equal protection claim, the group identify must be constantly and 
repetitively reassured before court. Thus, the effects of de jure discrimination 
structurally limit the scope of equal protection that de facto discriminated groups 
enjoy.
Part II: Formal De Jure Discrimination and its Effects – A Phenomenology
The de jure/de facto distinction offers a unique perspective on the way in 
which discriminated groups are constructed. The distinction affects a group's 
recognition in various ways through the different stages of discrimination and the 
development of antidiscrimination law. The difficulty, however, is that 
antidiscrimination law was initially based on the type of redressed discrimination 
being de jure.29 Law is one important source from which people draw their sense of
reality and "realness." It is one of society's most reliable mechanisms of producing 
reality or, as others sees it, of reflecting reality. It is the place where social consensus 
and dominant beliefs are being realized.30 De jure discrimination creates "differences" 
between groups, recognizes those differences, and construes those differences as 
meaningful. Therefore, the absence of groups or their "differences" from society's 
legal texts might signify their non-existence.
28 On the individualistic framework of the equal protection clause, see Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma 
of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the "Crisis" Facing African- American Males, 
23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 63, 71-87 (1994). On the role of the clause as protecting groups, see Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 123-127 (1976). However, this 
Article’s argument does not rely on a communal perception of the Equal Protection Clause, since even 
an individual claimant needs to prove membership in a group. 
29 Some scholarship has argued that the Court is approaching discrimination issues based on the 
assumption of formal, blatant discrimination even though de jure discrimination almost is now rare. See
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L. 
J. 279, 285 (1997) (“As long as… blatant barriers do not exist, the Court has difficulty seeing 
discrimination”).
30 This Article’s interest is not in the ideological controversy over the force of law as a sociological 
move or the law’s role in creating social norms. See Introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key 
Writings That Formed the Movement, at xxiv (Kimberle W. Crenshaw et al., 1995).
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The Article will now trace the effects that the different types of discrimination 
have on creating a group as a legal entity in the remedial stage.31 The effects are all 
relevant to the way in which a discriminated-against group's status as a legal entity, 
with legal relevance is generated. However, the effects themselves are somewhat 
independent from one another and have a cumulative influence on the formation of 
the group as legal entity, rather than having a gradual, dependent influence where one 
effect flows from the other. Nevertheless, the common thread between these effects is 
the way in which they allow the formation of de jure discriminated-against groups as
legal entities and the way the lack of these factors burdens de facto discriminated-
against groups. 
The effects of de jure discrimination that will be addressed in this Part 
structure the ability of a group to participate in the remedial stage, thus structurally 
barring groups that are "legally absent" from the discrimination discourse from 
benefiting in the curing stage. For these "legally absent" groups, the 
antidiscrimination battlefield is especially difficult, since they have to fight for redress 
in an area where they were never formally injured.
1) The Distinctiveness through Alienation Effect
Discrimination is a form of alienation and it aims at excluding someone from 
certain things or privileges. But, in order for there to be alienation, there must first be 
identification and acknowledgment of the alienated group's existence in order to 
frame that group as a distinct "other" that is subject to different treatment. 
"Identifying" the characteristics of the subject upon which exclusion is based requires 
that the subject has a distinctiveness common with the excluded group. From this 
viewpoint, the discourse of discrimination can be understood as having been utilized 
both as a means of causing the "other" to suffer from deprivation and alienation and 
as a means of forming that same "other" group.32 But perhaps paradoxically, this 
discriminating discourse retains some maneuvering potential since the legal language 
31 In tracing these different stages, the Article does not intend to expose a coherent, consistent, and 
gradual progress of the legal discourse on discrimination. Moreover, the different stages must have 
been infused with and influenced one another and they may not even constitute some developmental 
phases.Garry Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758 (1990) 
(considering some of the stages as a mere reflection of the opposing political ideologies of the 
integrationist and the nationalist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
32 This notion is compatible with Foucault’s perception of discrimination as an instrument for 
establishing identities and differences. See Chris Horrocks, Introducing Foucault 64 (1999).
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that the de jure discrimination employs plays into the hands of discriminated groups 
when the remedial stage begins. Discriminated against groups can now use the same 
classifying rhetoric that was used to define and exclude their group for their own 
benefit. In a sense, then, discriminated groups are able to trap the legal system by its 
own definitional creations. In other words, a group's distinct existence at the remedial 
stage is a consequence of the group identity and knowledge that was produced by the 
prior stage’s discriminatory discourse that recognized the group's “legal entity” by 
discriminating against that group. This existence of a "legal entity" means that the 
discriminated against group need not prove that the group has any "real" or essential 
existence; rather, the fact that the legal system treated the group as real is sufficient. 
The legal system, which creates this group identity and knowledge during the de jure 
discrimination phase, cannot ignore or re-contextualize the group identity at the 
remedial stage. Especially for racially categorized groups, whose composition is 
socially ambiguous and often based on vague characterizations, this effect of the law 
creating their legal identity is highly valuable in the remedial stage.33
The African-American group is a prominent illustration of this effect. The 
distinctiveness of the group was created through various discriminatory provisions of 
the law that needed to and shamelessly did define what a "Negro” was.34 These 
definitions were designed to meet the need to statutorily identify a person for 
exclusionary purposes35 and thereby created an indisputable "African-American  legal 
entity". Moreover, the legal system was indifferent to the divergent definitions used to 
“identify” the group, as the notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrates. In
Plessy, the Court considered Louisiana’s legal definition of African-Americans to be a 
matter of state legislative autonomy.36 The Court specifically refrained from defining 
the plaintiff’s race, indicating that so long as the segregation laws identified him as 
“colored,” his unique racial condition was legally irrelevant.37 The Court settled for 
the adoption of the statute’s language as the relevant legal definition for identifying 
33 Racial groups are here being contrasted with the cases of other groups; with women, for example, 
biology provides rather prominent distinctiveness to the group’s members.
34
 The Texas statute, for example, identified “Negros” as “all persons of mixed blood descended from 
Negro ancestry” or “a Negro or person of African descent”. Pauli Murray, States’ Laws on Race and 
Color 443-44 (1997). For the various terms used for "naming" African-Americans in general see 
Randall Kennedy, Nigger – The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word (2002).
35
 For the myriad “naming” of other groups in America who were not whites, see the comprehensive 
research considering discriminatory legislation all over the U.S. in Murray, id.
36
 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
37
 The petitioner, as the Court admitted, was "only 1/8 black" and had “Caucasian looks”. Ibid, at 
p.542
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the plaintiff's group. Adopting this definition also allowed the Court to ignore strong 
objections to the notion that there is any “real” biological meaning to race.38
On the other hand, the courts desire to look to statutory definitions rather than 
consider racial categorizations on their own initiative stood in the way of Mexican-
Americans being recognized as a discriminated against group for remedial purposes.39
The first case to acknowledge Mexican-Americans as a legally identifiable non-white 
group was Hernandez v. Texas,40 in 1954, where the Court concluded that the 
systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury duty on the basis of their 
“class” was unconstitutional.41 Nevertheless, in this decision the Court refused to 
adopt a broad conception of the affected group and instead pointed to evidence about 
the local discriminatory practices against Mexican-Americans; thus, the Court 
established the existence of Mexicans-Americans as an identifiable class only within 
specific circumstances. 
Although celebrated as a landmark step toward achieving legal visibility for 
Mexican-Americans,42 Hernandez also posed a difficult legacy for the group, since it 
relied on a localized rather than nationalized conception of the "group." This localized 
conception forced later Mexican-American petitioners to bear the heavy cost of 
repeatedly establishing local discrimination in each case. Strangely enough, for 
example, a plaintiff with a similar claim of discrimination in jury selection in Texas 
was forced to again prove that he belonged to an identifiable group because his 
petition related to different county than the one at issue in Hernandez.43 This legacy 
caused courts to refuse to recognize the group's standing for purposes of equal 
protection claims. Even in cases when it was decided that Mexican-Americans were a 
discriminated against group, like in the important case of Cisneros v. Corpus Christi 
38 Lisa K. Pomeroy, Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No. 15: Controversy over Race 
Categorization and the 2000 Census, 32 U. Tol. L. Rev. 67 (2000) (shows that racial categories are not 
generic or natural but rather are a social construct). There is a clear discrepancy between the social 
science acceptance of the social nature of race and the legal system's refusal to accept this notion. Id, at 
69-70. 
39 For example, see the cases discussed in Delgado & Palacios, supra note 6, in which Mexican-
Americans were not recognized as a group for class action and equal protection purposes. 
40 Supra note 27.
41 The Court refused, though, to identify the group on the basis of race or color. For the devastating 
consequences of this reluctance, see Ian Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race 
to LatCrit Theory, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1158 (1997).
42 Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 6, at 16.
43 For example, see the court's words in a case concluding "It appears and the court so finds that there is 
in Bexar County an identifiable ethnic group referred to as Mexican Americans…" United States v.
Hunt, 265 F. Supp. 178, 188 (W.D. Tex. 1967). Ten years later, an all-Texas Mexican-American group 
was considered identifiable in that same matter. See Castaneda, supra note 27. 
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Ind. School District,44 the court’s language was never the  definitive language that 
would have recognized Mexican-Americans as a broad, rather than a local, group. 
Lacking any de jure discrimination to define the group before it, the Court has looked 
for "cultural", "biological", and "social" evidence to support the existence of 
Mexican-Americans as a group.45 Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of 
Mexican-American's – such as their surnames, cultural heritage, and appearance -
have constantly been questioned on the grounds that they lack social “realness” or 
relevance to creating a group identity for Mexican-Americans. This confusion is 
captured in the sincere struggle of courts and their inability to conclusively identify 
the group before them:46
“It is clear to this court that Mexican-Americans, or Americans with 
Spanish surnames, or whatever they are called, or whatever they would 
like to be called, Latin-Americans, or several other new names of 
identification -- and parenthetically the court will take notice that this 
naming for identification phenomena is similar to that experienced in 
the Negro groups: black, Negro, colored, and now black again, with an 
occasional insulting epithet that is used less and less by white people… 
fortunately…it is clear to this court that these people for whom we 
have used the word Mexican-Americans to describe their class, group, 
or segment of our population, are an identifiable ethnic minority… 
This is not surprising; we can notice and identify their physical 
characteristics, their language, their predominant religion, their distinct 
culture, and, of course, their Spanish surnames.
In searching for "a name," and lacking any prior de jure definition of the 
group, the court is forced to create the group on its own. Trying to come with an 
acceptable definition, the court compares the naming difficulty with Mexican-
Americans to the name changes that have accompanied the African-American group; 
this comparison, though, exemplifies the differences between the groups caused by 
their distinct discrimination forms. As opposed to court’s analogy, the "naming" 
experiences of the two groups in fact diverged both in reason and in outcome. The 
"list of names" for African-Americans that court lists represents the abundance of
identifications that were attached by de jure discrimination; thus, there was no 
confusion or indeterminacy in the remedial stage, only different names attached to a 
44 324 F. Supp 599, at 606-607 (1970).
45 In this case, the court declared that the group was an identifiable as an ethnic minority. However, in 
order to justify its conclusionwhich was not derived from a de jure definition of the group, the court, in 
a footnote, considered an expert's testimony on the matter and discussed at length the characteristics of 
an identifiable group. Id, id (footnotes 29 and 30).
46 Id, at 606-08.
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well-defined group. Thus, these names have not compromised the ability of courts to 
consistently identify the group before them as the same group of African-Americans. 
The Mexican-American "list" of names, however, demonstrates the lack of any prior 
legal definition of the group for court to rely upon at the curing stage.
Later cases in which court again held that Mexican-Americans are an 
identifiable class, like the infamous Keyes case,47 have not yet had the all-
encompassing effect of creating group recognition.48 In sum, unlike African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans have to each time first constitute themselves as a 
group and only then make their specific allegations of discrimination.
2) The Collaborating-Organizational Effect
The ability and potential of minorities to politically organize has a key role in 
affecting their political power. Ackerman, who discusses minorities' entitlement to 
judiciary protection, refers to the idea of a “pluralist democracy,” which assumes that 
various interest groups negotiate with one another about the rules that they eventually 
democratically legislate. Within this framework, minority groups suffer from a 
systematic disadvantage, called the countermajoritarian difficulty, due to their lack of 
power to negotiate with the powerful majority.49 A famous dictum by Justice Stone in 
the Carolene Products case suggested that “discrete and insular minorities” were the 
ones who suffered most from democratic ineffectiveness and were the ones who were 
eligible for and entitled to protection from the judiciary when the legislature failed to 
provide such protection. Ackerman criticizes the Court’s definition. Both insularity 
and discreteness, he argues, have an empowering rather than a disempowering effect 
on the political bargaining power of a group, since these characteristics make the 
groups more able to operate collectively.50 Here, again, the powerful effect of de jure 
discrimination is of enormous relevance. Legally institutionalized discrimination 
enhances intra-group collectivity.51 Naturally, a group member's consciousness of 
being discriminated against revolves around the notion of the group's oppression as a 
whole, and formal, de jure discrimination makes that group oppression much more 
powerful, painful, and outrageous. On the other hand, groups that do not suffer from 
47 Supra note 17. TheCourt declared that this class existed “for purposes of the fourteenth amendment".
48 Delgado & Palacios, supra note 6, at 396.
49 See Ackerman, supra note 22, at 719-722. Although critical of the pluralistic democracy ideology, 
Ackerman adheres to it as the leading concern of the judiciary. Id, at 722.
50 Id, at 723-40.
51 Id, at 729. Ackerman points to insularity of the group as enhancing this effect.
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blatant, evidential, formal discrimination, but rather suffer from more covert 
discrimination, are expected to have a lesser sense of group identity and a higher level 
of self-denial of their discriminated against position. 
Using legislation to discriminate provokes a sharper sense of humiliation, of 
otherness, and of alienated outsiderness.52 Reflecting this notion is Dean Ely’s 
psychological approach to the legislative process, which represents de jure
discrimination as a positioning of the relations between the relevant groups in a “we”-
“they” dichotomy. "We" refers to the hegemonic oppressor, represented by the 
legislative and "they" refers to the de jure discriminated against group.53 In this 
framework, discrimination constitutes the other as a "minority", in the sense of a 
majority manifesting political superiority over the minority and hence forcing the 
minority to admit its relative political powerlessness and recognize its proper place 
within social power relationships. For example, African-Americans, as the addressees 
of the discriminating laws, could not see themselves as its authors.54 Understood this 
way, a lack of de jure discrimination against a de facto discriminated group creates an 
"we-all" as opposed to a "we-they" political structure, which eases any traces of 
distinctiveness and discourages the development of a group consciousness among the 
de facto discriminated against group.  
This notion is clear in the Mexican-American case, where since Mexican-
Americans suffered from de facto discrimination, they were treated by court as "the 
other white," a group that deserved not to be discriminated against.  This “other 
white” strategy55 demonstrates the coalescing effect, where neither side in the 
discriminatory regime develops a consciousness of real power relations between the 
parties. Moreover, symbolically this strategy was a statement about the inclusiveness 
of Mexican-Americans and their lack of distinctiveness from whites. In Mendez v. 
Westminster School Dist. Of Orange County,56 where Mexican-Americans won the 
right to have schools integrated because the court considered them to be "white"," the 
court distinguished them from de jure discriminated against groups. Relying on 
52 See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 88-89 (1991).
53 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). I refrain from using this analysis to justify court 
intervention, as Ely does, and rather borrow the idea of the alienating power of discriminating laws.
54 Here this Article adopts Habermasian terms. Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the 
Democratic Constitutional State, in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 107, 121-
122 (Charles Taylor et al., 1994).
55 On the employment of this strategy by activists see Rangel & Alcala, supra note 20, at 342-48.
56 161 F.2d 774 (Cal. 1947).
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California’s rules forbidding discrimination unless it was against colored and black 
people, the court concluded that the discrimination against the plaintiffs was 
unconstitutional. This decisions furthered the symbolic effect of the “we”-“they” 
dichotomy, whereby Mexican Americans were placed within the “we” group and not 
in the “they” group. Mexican-Americans were thus considered “one of the great 
races” and contrasted with other races that were denied equal participation in 
education.57 But this placement of Mexican-Americans in the "we" group fails to 
acknowledge the power relations between Whites and Mexican-Americans. In this 
power relationship, Mexican-Americans are a discriminated against minority, but the 
court's decisions instead position Mexican-Americans side by side with whites. Thus, 
de jure discriminated against groups, were marked as “the real” others, whereas 
Mexican-Americans were not the other. This explains part of the difficulty Mexican 
Americans had in their quest for recognition as a “group”.58
In the terms of Ackerman’s critique, the geographical insularity of the group is 
less effective and the discreteness of the group is blurred with non-de jure
discriminated against groups. The consciousness of any group of its own identity is a 
crucial prerequisite for any organized political action. Hence, the geographical 
advantage is particularly effective where the group has a discrimination-oriented 
consciousness and is less effective in cases where the group lacks such a 
consciousness or where that consciousness is less pronounced. As history 
demonstrates, although both African-Americans and Mexican Americans lived in 
insularity as groups, the former was more able successfully to organize as a 
community, to develop a racially proud consciousness, and eventually to better, 
relatively speaking, their social status.59
This effect of de jure discrimination has been previously observed. In 
criticizing the transition from the formal discrimination era of Jim Crow to the formal 
equality era, Kimberle Crenshaw points to the problematic effects that this transition 
has had on the African-American community. Crenshaw criticizes the fact that what 
was primarily abolished through that transition was the symbolic oppression of 
African-Americans represented by legal ordinances, rather than actual, material 
57 Id, at 780.
58 See Delgado & Palacio, supra note 6. 
59 Luna, supra note 11, at 232, 247.
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oppression, which consisted of less formal discriminating practices.60 African-
Americans derived much of the collective political power within their community 
from the formal nature of their discrimination, not only vis-à-vis Whites, but also vis-
à-vis themselves. The one-rule-to-all discrimination imposed upon African-Americans 
by de jure discrimination had an inclusive effect and almost of all the community 
members--even its most advantaged and pro-assimilationist members--were unable to 
avoid or deny their belonging to the group. This discrimination imprisoned all of them 
under its strict rules, without exception, rendering inefficient most assimilationist 
strategies. Once the shift was made to the formal equality era, important portions of 
the group, particularly those well-off or assimilationist African-Americans, parted 
from it in what Crenshaw calls “the loss of collectivity.”61 Prior to that stage, even the 
Integrationist Movement, a pro-assimilation movement, emphasized difference in its 
agenda and had no illusions of African-Americans belonging to the white 
hegemony.62 Dr. King, an integrationist himself, strictly called upon disobedience to 
de jure discrimination.63 De jure discrimination was also the reason for the evolution 
of and the main target of the revolutionary Black Civil Rights Movement,64 whose 
consciousness was built upon fighting the evil of institutionalized discrimination. A 
black scholar once wrote: "Law does not exist in a vacuum and racism is not solely a 
by-product of law."65 This statement is an apt description of the mindset of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960's. De jure discrimination has been a very powerful 
motivation for the Movement’s admirable struggle.66
Crenshaw located her critique within the African-Americans and White-
Americans relations, but it can be easily applied to this Article's analysis within 
discriminated-against groups. Unlike their African-American peers, Mexican-
Americans did not suffer from blatant, formally legal alienation and thus were not as 
easily considered-- either by themselves or by others--as “out-laws” from the social 
60 For Crenshaw’s distinction see Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377.
61 Id, at 1382-1383.
62
 On Dr. King’s conceptions of racism see Derrick Bell, Triumph in Challenge, 54 MD. L. Rev.1691 
(1995).
63 In the famous “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” Dr. King presented his objection to de jure
discrimination as derived from respect for law. Martin L. King Jr., Why We Can’t Wait 167 (1963) 
64 Peller, supra note 31, at 809 (presenting Malcolm X's view on segregation).
65David Hall, Racism and the Limitation of Law: An Afro-centric Perspective of Law, Society and 
Collective Rights 13 (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988).
66 Regardless of the criticism of the movement’s concentration on de jure discrimination, the fact that 
the legal struggle should have been accompanied by a social one does not mean that this struggle was 
mistaken.
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system. The lack of de jure discrimination caused Crenshaw’s “loss of collectivity” 
within the Mexican-American consciousness and produced an imagined sense among 
Mexican-Americans that they belonged to the hegemony. The absence of de jure 
discrimination sent a message of assimilation and made an elaborated legal fight 
appear irrelevant.67 The history of the Mexican-American civil rights movements thus 
is more complex and assimilative than the history of the African-American civil rights 
movement does. Organizations like the League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC), established in the late 1920's, and the Mexican American's Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund (MALDEF), established in the late 1960's, took the lead in 
litigating against the de facto discrimination Mexican-Americans suffered.68 They 
relied overwhelmingly on an integrationist and assimilative ideology rather than on a 
separatist or a group-collectivist ideology; perhaps partly for this reason, these groups 
have failed to receive nationwide attention, despite their considerable achievements.69
Scholars speculate as to the conditions that have shaped this strategy, and the 
suggestions have ranged from the community’s weak social and political condition to 
an incompatibility among the personalities of the leadership.70 I suggest another 
factor, namely the ambiguity on the part of the American legal system about the 
group’s legal status. The fact that the law did not discriminatorily define the group has 
had an anti-radical impact on the self-consciousness and self-perception of its 
members and leaders with regard to their belonging to a discriminated against group.
Another aspect Ackerman points to is that the more discrete the members of a 
group are, the easier it is to track them and commit them to the group’s political 
struggle. African-Americans are an example of a discrete group, who because of their 
skin color are easy to track; Ackerman presents homosexuals as a counterexample, 
since their membership is more anonymous and not superficially prominent, thereby 
making homosexuals harder to track and politically mobilize. Ackerman furthers 
argues that even when tracked, a group member would have to let go of his or her 
67
 Matt S. Meier & Margo Gutierrez, Encyclopedia of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movements 
130 (2000). LULAC had initiated only two lawsuits in the late 1940s, although these lawsuits were 
fairly substantial.
68
 For a discussion of the myriad of Mexican-American civil rights movements, see id.
69
 LULAC’s official constitution mentioned Mexican pride, but emphasized that Mexican-Americans 
were white. Id, at 130. Although the nationalist ideology of the Mexican-American civil rights 
movement was apparent, that nationalism mainly focused on Mexican “border issues”. See Michael 
Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s 103-04 
(1986).
70 Meier & Gutierrez, supra note 67, at 127-29.
22
anonymity in order to engage in a political struggle and that this revealing is 
something members of anonymous groups would hesitate to do. By so doing, a 
member of the anonymous group would risk “revealing” his or her identity and would 
position himself or herself on a social battlefield.71 Ackerman's discussion of 
"discreteness" focuses on the physical "visibility" of the group, but this Article 
focuses on the legal dimension of discreteness. Once the group is visible to the law, 
meaning that it has been defined and recognized by the legal system through de jure
discrimination, that group also becomes more politically visible. Thus, although 
homosexuals are relatively "socially invisible," this Article argues that homosexuals 
are substantively "legally present" and enjoy a substantial amount of political 
visibility. 
The discourse of sexual orientation-based discrimination dealt initially with 
prohibitions on sodomy.72 Later, the struggle for homosexual rights targeted other de 
jure provisions, again triggering a legal discussion that increased the legal visibility of 
the group. Until Romer v. Evans,73the Court did not find homosexuals to constitute a 
group that was entitled to special constitutional protections. Moreover, in the first case 
to discuss homosexual's right to equal protection, Bowers v. Hardwick,74 the dicussion 
revolved around homosexual activity rather than homosexuals as an entity or group. 
But Romer led to the law considering homosexuals as a group, even though Romer
did not grant homosexuals all of the constitutional protection they sought. In Romer, 
homosexuals were discriminated against de jure by a state constitution, so the Court’s 
discussion also has a group-based orientation. Thus, the distinctiveness given to the 
group by the legislature made the group legally viable.75
Considering groups that are discriminated against de facto extends 
Ackerman’s conception of discreteness to a symbolic level where the law constitutes 
presence. In contrast to homosexuals, members of de facto discriminated against 
71 Ackerman, supra note 22, at 729-31.
72 Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Legal Articulation of Sexual Orientation and Identity, in
After Identity: A Reader in Law and Culture (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle, 1995).
73 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
74
 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
75 The representation of homosexual people as “a group” is yet to be defined by de jure provisions, 
since those provisions tend to address homosexual activities rather than a homosexual entity. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (prohibiting sodomy with de jure provisions). In Lawrence, 
the Justices were divided as to whether the issue at hand should be considered as an equal protection 
challenge--conceptualizing the case as group based (the minority)--or as a due process one--
conceptualizing the case as activity based (the majority). On the gay status/conduct distinction, see 
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L. Jour. 769, 872-73 (2002) (introducing the different 
assimilationist strategies of minorities).
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groups suffer from “legal anonymity". They are locked in a legal closet, which
enhances their chances for assimilation and enables them to refrain from political 
confrontations.76 In contrast, legally discrete groups who earn their discreteness from  
de jure discrimination cannot as easily ignore or deny their oppression and are more
limited in their assimilation ability. Thus, members of these groups are far more likely 
to be ready to organize politically to fight for better treatment. The legal discreteness 
of de jure discriminated against groups also creates a supportive social-political 
environment both among the group members and also in the form of goodwill from 
people outside the group who support the abolition of the recognized de jure
discrimination.77
3) The visibility and witnessing effect or “unhappiness without a title is double 
unhappiness”78
The legal discourse produces through discrimination not only a classification 
of groups, but presence for those groups. Presence is therefore the signifie of 
discrimination, its signifiant.79 De jure discrimination gives public presence to its 
subjects and narrated their discriminated experience. In the remedial stage, the same 
narrative that was used by the legal system for discrimination against the group is 
used to justify giving anti-discrimination relief to the members of that group. 
Moreover, number of different situations in which de jure discrimination existed 
created multiple narratives of oppression and exclusion that had to be revealed in the 
remedial stage: where de jure discrimination ordered segregated schools, the narrative 
of exclusion from the education system had been told; where it ordered employment 
segregation, the narrative of exclusion from the employment market had been told; 
and so forth. These narratives of discrimination, suffering, and deprivation were 
outlined by de jure regulations and affected the transparency and visibility of both the 
group’s existence and the group's oppression.
76
 Such an analysis adopts the presumption that people would prefer exiting to engaging in a 
confrontation. Ackerman stresses this assumption, relying on Albert Hirschman's work on confronting 
unsatisfactory situations. Ackerman, supra note 22, at 730-31.
77
 The NAACP's struggle, for example, was founded both by both whites and African Americans. See 
Equal Protection and the African-American Constitutional Experience – A Documentary History 179-
181 (Robert P. Greed ed., 2000).
78 Hanna Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen – The Life of a Jewess 173 (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1997).
79 For an elaboration on semiotics and the law see Bernard S. Jackson, Semiotics and Legal Theory 
(1997).
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This effect is part of a larger theoretical scheme of "visibility," emphasizing 
the powerfulness of the legal discourse, which excludes minorities by their absence 
them from legal texts and reasoning. This absence from the law's formal and 
substantive foundations designate the excluded party as the "other" and demonstrate 
that its need are as unimportant to the legal world as they are elsewhere in society.80
The argument of this Article exceeds the limits of this "invisibility" critique. It argues 
that “absence” refers not only to absence from receiving the benefits of the law, but 
also an absence from suffering from the drawbacks of the law, specifically being 
absent from the legal discrimination mechanism. The alleged invisibility of de jure
discriminated-against groups marks them as the "other," whereas the absence of de 
facto discriminated-against groups signifies their complete non-existence.81 For 
example, using legal language to determine the "nature" of a person in order to 
classify him or her under a Jim Crow statute's requirements shapes the notion of a 
legal category. Silence, on the other hand, is a choice not only not to include but also 
a choice at the same time not to exclude. Silence is the decision to "non-clude." By 
"non-cluding," this Article means a situation where a group is being discriminated 
against yet is not being subjugated by explicit formal expressions of the law. The 
group is fully "named" by society's coercion since it suffers from discrimination, but 
is nameless under the law. Moreover, it does not exist as a group or entity. Although it 
is true that discriminated-against groups such as women and African-Americans also 
suffered from injustice and inequality that might be termed "lawlessness," they were 
at the same time subject to the control of the legal system and thus were subject to 
lawfulness.82 These groups are therefore relatively visible on the spectrum of 
"visibility"; in contrast, Mexican-Americans fall into a category of extreme 
invisibility.
De facto discriminated against groups extends another extreme of the visibility 
spectrum. “Invisibility” is commonly used to describe also the omnipresence of a 
80 See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
Am. U.L. Rev. 1065 (1985) (Discusses the invisibility of women in contract law).
81
 For a close analysis of invisibility and non-existence see Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or 
Hale and Foucault, Legal Studies Forum  327, 333 (1991).
82 For lawlessness in women's life see Marjorie Maguire Schultz, The Voices of Women: A 
Symposium in Legal Education: The Gendered Curriculum of Contracts and Carreers, 77 Iowa L. Rev.
55, 58 (1991) (arguing that contract laws deserted paradigmatic contractual issues regarding familial 
relations). On lawlessness in African-American's life see Frankie Y. Bailey & Alice P. Green, Law 
Never Here (Westport, Connecticut, 1999) (describing in a short story the meanings that law had in the 
lives of black slaves).
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group that need not be “named”, rather than describe the non-existence of the “un-
named” group. In race and feminist critical theory, the invisible “un-named” is the 
group whose dominance and hegemony shapes the relevant social system and thus 
does not need to be explicitly named and presented.83 In legal terms, critical theory 
argues that the law represents the white-male-heterosexual epistemology and life-
experience and thus this group does not need to be named in the law.84 Therefore, this 
archetype's absence from the legal texts is misleading since it reflects the group's 
constituting presence. In this Article, however, the terminology of “un-naming” is 
being used in a different manner. By “un-named” groups, this Article means those 
that suffer from an impotent absence, and not from an all-encompassing 
omnipresence. This Article contrasts the “naming” of minorities, such as African-
Americans and women, not only with the “un-naming” of the dominant group of 
white men but also with the “un-naming” of other discriminated-against groups. 
Considering these other discriminated-against groups visible challenges the traditional 
conceptualization of “naming” as exclusionary and “un-naming” as inclusive. Instead, 
this Article suggests a broader conception that will treat the “un-named” 
discriminated groups as being as invisible as a group can be. 
The theoretical scheme of "invisibility" this Article addresses is affected by 
the legal visibility of the group as follows. Different, relative degrees of legal 
visibility and invisibility are located on a continuum. At one end there are laws that 
make the "otherness" of the laws' subject explicit. For example, laws denying access 
to public facilities that specifically named "Blacks" made the "otherness" of African-
Americans apparent. In this case the discriminated group is more overtly 
distinguished than with laws where the ban is, for example, on "Colored" people, 
which is a general term encompassing various non-white groups.85 Next to these 
explicit laws on the continuum are implied laws, such as laws with a "whites only" 
requirement. This sort of implicit law does not "name" the other, rather "names" the 
opposite, privileged entity. Here, the group's absence could nevertheless signify its 
83 Simon De-Beauvoir, The Other Sex (1949); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of 
the State 96-105 (1989).
84 On the “whiteness” of the law see Kenneth B. Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 Law & 
Ineq. 323 (1997).
85 In the case of Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), the Supreme Court affirmed a decision that 
allowed the exclusion of a Chinese child from a white school on the ground that the law required 
separate schools for "whites" and "colored" races. Chinese were also considered “Indians” by law. See 
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (prohibiting the testimony of an Indian witness).
26
existence because of the statute’s “wholeness” impact. According to this impact, 
discriminatory statutes are always positioned within a semantic field of "social power 
relations" where the oppressor and oppressed groups are "different" from one another 
and can signify one another.86 In the relatively narrow area of legal discrimination, 
naming the privileged group in a statute signifies the discriminated group as missing 
from the holistic frame of the oppressor and the oppressed, namely, from the statute's 
wholeness. For example, due to the black-white paradigm, "African-Americans" are 
members of a set of mutually exclusive forms of discrimination with "whites" as their 
opposite. This dichotomy is why statutorily privileging a "white" group would signify 
the presence of its "other," specifically African-Americans, but not, for example, the 
presence of Mexican-Americans, since Mexican-Americans are not the dichotomous 
opposite of "whites" and thus are not signified by the inclusion of "whites". Alongside 
this spectrum of visibility, both explicit and implicit de jure discrimination enhances 
the formation of the discriminated group as an entity.
In sum, de jure discrimination affects the magnitude of the visibility both of 
the existence of the group itself and of its discrimination-based suffering. Working 
from within the legal system, de jure discrimination brought the groups it defined into 
canonical legal texts. Law canonizes discriminated groups, providing them the 
necessary "naming" for all prospective antidiscrimination purposes during a later 
remedial stage.87 Being named by the law has implications just as being named by the 
social sphere or by politicians would. Formal de jure discrimination is more 
systematic and more exposed to the public than de facto discrimination is, thereby 
conveying greater visibility to the subjects of that discrimination. This effect helps 
explain the weak position of Mexican-Americans in the American antidiscrimination 
discourse. Although Mexican-Americans are relatively physically distinct, their 
recognition as a discriminated-against group has lacked any “legal” support since they 
were not discriminated-against by the law; this lack of "legal" support deprives the 
group of legal viability in asserting their claims during the remedial stage.
4) The Moral Blameworthy and Institutional Legitimacy Effect 
86 Those images are considered to be Greimasian semiotics of law. See, generally, Jackson, supra note 
79, at p.31-43.
87 The discriminated-against group has to prove each time a concrete discrimination that needs to be 
addressed; nevertheless, it does not need to prove that the group itself is identifiable.
27
Antidiscrimination rules are meant to rectify the countermajoritanian 
difficulties minorities face and to redress harmful injuries that the law or society has 
inflicted upon them. 88 Therefore, institutional legitimacy and moral blameworthiness 
suggest that it is important for the same legal mechanisms that discriminated to be the 
mechanisms used to provide the remedies.  In other words, de jure discrimination 
provides direct, formal access to the legal system's remedial functions for de jure
discriminated-against groups. The formalism of the legal system and the documentary 
nature of de jure discrimination make such discrimination unforgettable to the legal 
system. De jure discrimination is less likely or plausibly to be denied than de facto
discrimination is. Although nations tend to forget their historical evils, 
institutionalized documents make such forgetfulness harder. A legislative and 
adjudicative change of hearts does not erase the legal history of a nation, but rather 
place another narrative next to that history. Discriminatory legal rules can be 
expunged from a nation’s book of statutes, but their past existence viability is always 
evident and traceable. The vast documentation of the Jim Crow regulations and the 
judicial revisiting of Dred Scott89 and Plessy demonstrate the strong presence of the 
past institutional suffering of African-Americans. This documented past was during 
the remedial stage a source for vast legal condemnation of the past institutional
suffering and thus a firm justification for remediation.90
De jure discrimination powerfully situates its subjects within the legal system 
as the subjects of legal practice. Reflecting again on Ackerman’s work, one might 
observe that the judiciary restricts its activism with regard to “non-legal” issues. The 
judiciary's commitment to protecting discrete and insular minorities assumes some 
prior legal recognition of such minority groups. Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
the discrete and insular minorities test as being inherently legal. This test aims at 
protecting groups from de jure discrimination alone. Other forms of discrimination 
are not thought of as proper areas for judicial intervention due to the traditional 
legal/social dichotomy that seeks to preserve the "social" as a sphere beyond equality 
law and thus that allows for the continuation of racial inequality outside the official 
88 The goals of an antidiscrimination regime are varied and are not merely formal.  See Brest, supra
note 2, at 6-9. Brest, though, speaks in terms of preventing harms to minorities, whereas this Article 
also focuses on correcting harms already done to minorities.
89 Dred Scott v. Stanford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857)
90
 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing affirmative action).
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reach of the state.91 As this Article has previously argued, Mexican-Americans were 
only partially recognized by the legal system. Since they did not suffer from de jure 
discrimination, it was easier to consider Mexican-Americans to be a “social” rather 
than a “legal” entity. The Court’s reluctance to declare that the discrimination against 
Mexican-Americans was de jure meant that Mexican-Americans had no legal 
relevance as a group. In the Hernandez case, the Court focused to “social” 
motivations for discrimination rather than “legal” ones, thus deriving the “emergence” 
of the Mexican-American group within this specific from a change in "community 
prejudices" against them. Moreover, the wisdom of the Court's reliance on "social 
changes" triggering recognition of Mexican-Americans is challenged by the fact that 
discrimination against Mexican-American was by far long lasting.92 In the case of de 
jure discriminated-against groups, the law’s involvement transformed what might 
have otherwise been considered a "wholly social" matter in to a “wholly legal” one, 
by establishing the group as having legal viability. For example, in the famous case of 
Strauder v. West Virginia,93 the Court focused on the devastating impact of de jure
discrimination in excluding African-Americans from “civil society.” This observation 
conceives the social harm inflicted on them as also being a legal harm.
Conservative legal theories and positive legalism claim that law merely 
reflects society's desires. The critique from the left, on the other hand, argues that the 
law is actively involved in the production and maintenance of society's power 
relations. This debate, though, is less important once legal involvement is present in 
the wronging. Through de jure discrimination the legal system created as well as 
reflected reality, unraveling the line between the legal and the social realms.94 Under 
these circumstances, adherence to the legal righting process is to be expected, because 
once the law had been formally involved in "wronging," there is a need for it to 
reverse its involvement. The high attention that de jure discriminated-against groups 
receive from the legal system during the remedial stage can be understood as a result 
91
 This tactic is well-established in American equality laws. See Angela P. Harris, Symposium on Law 
in the Twentieth Century: Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth Century Race Law, 
88 Calif. L. Rev. 1923, 1935 (2000).
92 For the history of the subordination and oppression of Mexican-Americans, see Arnold De Leon, 
They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas 1821-1900 (1983).
93
 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
94 Kennedy, supra note 81, at 347.
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of a corrective justice desire to right past undeniable wrongs that were caused by the 
legal system itself.95
Affirmative action is the most prominent manifestation of this effect. 
Although the American legal system had not yet developed a well-established 
position as to affirmative action's constitutionality or normative desirability, 
affirmative action programs have nonetheless been judicially approved.96 The 
inclination of courts in these cases to generally hold against general affirmative action 
programs while approving programs that aim to remedy concrete legal discrimination 
highlights the importance of de jure discrimination. The more concrete and unjust the 
past discrimination was--particularly if such discrimination resulted from the legal 
system itself rather than simply from society--the more justified present affirmative 
action is.97 This is the essence of antidiscrimination law, as Robert Post describes it: 
“…antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history, which means that it 
must participate in the very practices that it seeks to alter and regulate.”98 The 
involvement of the judiciary benefiting de jure discriminated-against groups in the 
remedial stage can thus be understood as being motivated by institutional 
remorsefulness.99
5) The Intentional Discrimination Presumption Effect
The de jure/de facto distinction has an active role in determining the intent or 
purpose in the challenged discriminatory act. The presence of de jure discrimination 
is an important factor in establishing an act as intentional. An example of this role is 
the Court's statement that the intent behind explicit de jure discrimination  in the past 
may be used in the present to prove intent regardless of chronological remoteness.100
95 Owen M. Fiss, A Community of Equals: The Constitutional Protection of New Americans 14 (Beacon 
Press Boston, 1999).
96
 A study of related petitions shows lack of coherence in the Court's attitude in this matter. See Eugene 
Volokh, "Racial and Ethnic Classifications in American Law" in Beyond the color line– New 
Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America 309, 310-14 (Eds: Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan 
Thernstrom, 2002). This Article’s interest is not in the normative justifications for affirmative action, 
but rather in its effect on constituting the "legally cognized discriminated group".
97
 See Justice Powell’s opinions in Bakke, and Fullilove, supra note 90. The Court, nonetheless, has 
recently turned to diversity as primary justification for affirmative action. See Colin S. Diver, From 
Equality to Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691.
98 Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in 
Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law 1, 22 (Robert C. Post et al, 
2001).
99 Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1382 (stressing that de jure discrimination has encouraged federal 
involvement in aiding the  African-American struggle for equality).
100 Keyes, supra note 17, at 210-11. The scope of this relevance is nevertheless limited.
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Unsurprisingly, this logic was applied primarily in cases where de jure discrimination 
previously existed.101 The practical implication of this logic is large because equal 
protection claims are limited to claims that can prove intentional discrimination, and 
this logic allows the court to assume intentional discrimination. This logic thus has a 
"narrating" effect, where it allows the group's narrative of oppression to be told.102
Moreover, the "narrating" effect also has an epistemological effect by causing the 
narrated information to be absorbed into the formal legal system and used by the 
narrating group to achieve redress for past discrimination. In other words, the logic is 
that the institutionalization of de jure discrimination signified a pattern of oppressive 
behavior that could be used to prove intentionality, whereas de facto discrimination 
was perceived as non-institutional, incidental, and random and thus could not be used 
to prove the intentionality necessary to assert an equal protection claim.103
6) The Non-legal Effect of De Jure Discrimination
This Article does not discuss the vast set of reciprocal relations between law, 
discrimination, and society, since those are beyond its scope. This Article instead will 
simply note the unique influence de jure discrimination has upon the formation of a 
legally cognized group.104
First, it is important to note that there is no strict, clear relations between the 
legal status of a group and the social status of a group as one that is discriminated 
against. Some groups may not be discriminated-against by the law and yet suffer 
discrimination from society. De facto discriminated-against groups demonstrate this 
idea well. At the same time, some groups may be de jure discriminated against by the 
law without being discriminated against by society in fact.105 Nevertheless, in 
101 See, e.g., Cisneros, supra note 12, at 148 (finding, nevertheless, de jure discrimination despite no 
prior history of state law segregation); United states v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 
385, 397 (5th Cir. La. 1967); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
Particularly interesting is Keyes where the petitioners were both Mexican-Americans and African-
Anericans, yet while discussing the injustice of the de jure/de facto distinction, Justices Douglas and 
Powell refered only to the African-American petitioners. Beckett v. The School Board of the City of 
Norfolk, 308 F. Supp 1274, 1304 (holding that intentional state action can easily be identified whenever  
there is prior de jure discrimination against the group).
102 See, for example, Columbus Bd. Of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
103 For examples of myriad cases thus decided see Martinez, supra note19, id.
104 By this the Article adopts an anti-racial legal theory proposition that measures its effectiveness only 
as far as it examines the "non-legal" aspects of social change. See Hall, Supra note , at 4.
105 A statute in Massachusetts that ordered the arrest of any Native Americans entering the state is a 
good example. This 17th century statute has managed to survive on the state’s law books, although the 
state itself obviously abandoned its discriminatory practices against Indians. Nevertheless, although not 
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between these poles, there is certainly a correlation between the use of the law to 
order society and between enhancing the social and self-awareness around a group 
subjugated to de jure discrimination. Once discrimination is institutionalized in law, 
that legal discrimination distinguishes the group from the rest of society and implies 
the “realness” of the differences recognized by the law. Recognition by the law also 
makes visible (and harder to deny) at least some of the suffering by the discriminated-
against group. Thus, by removing a group from society's legal canon and by no longer 
discriminating against that group under the law, this removal creates some social 
commitment to equality vis-a-vis that group.106  These impacts are relevant both to the 
discriminated-against group and the discriminating group. De jure discriminated-
against group members are better positioned to develop the self-consciousness about 
their position that is needed for that group to initiate an effective legal and political 
struggle for rights. 
A story of a Mexican-American battle against discrimination will help to 
illustrate this effect. The story, called the Felix Longoria Incident, occurred in Texas 
in 1949. Longoria was an American soldier who died during World War II. The local 
mortician refused to allow him to be buried at the chapel because of Longoria’s 
Mexican origin.107 Hector Garcia, an activist working for a Mexican-American Forum 
challenged this discrimination. As with most of the discriminatory acts against 
Mexican-Americans in Texas, the burial refusal was not de jure based. As 
demonstrated by the fact that this case received substantial sympathetic public 
attention, the public reaction to the discrimination, which in general denied it, was of 
a different nature than if the discrimination had been based in law and hence “legal”. 
The incident was portrayed as an atypical incident, even though in fact separate burial 
services and cemeteries were common. It was resolved as a misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the funeral house owner's words. Since the mortician's behavior 
lacking any official approval in law, the public blamed Garcia for stirring up trouble 
in an area where problems did not truly existed 
enforced, the statute has caused anguish to and has been widdely criticized as being derogating to 
Native Americans.
106Even though it might be that a change of the law does not fulfill the wish of the discriminated group 
for equality, it undeniably betters its over-all position. See Reva Siegel, The Critical Use of History: 
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
Stan. L. Rev. 1111 (claiming that antidiscrimination laws were aimed at bettering the civil and political 
rights of African-Americans but not their social ones).
107
 This incident is detailed in the biography of Hector P. Garcia, a Mexican-American activist. Ignacio 
M. Garcia, Hector P. Garcia: In Relentless Pursuit of Justice 104-39 (2002).
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These types of public denials of the reality of discrimination are typical with 
non-de jure discrimination. Similar de jure discrimination could not have been 
denied. The truth of de jure discrimination neither relies on matters of interpretation 
over “what exactly has been said” nor does it rely on the credibility of the party 
alleging discrimination, since in both cases the law is clearly authorizing 
discrimination. Since de jure discrimination is institutionalized, it's effect cannot be 
dismissed as a private, unrepresentative dispute as de facto discrimination often can 
be. Declaring war on de jure discrimination is more likely to generate public support 
than war on de facto discrimination, to which the public might respond as it did to 
Garcia's work that the activists are just stirring up trouble. De jure discrimination is 
more difficult to rationalize or deny. As a result, this de facto discrimination case with 
the Texas burial was resolved on a very local, specific level and the mortician agreed, 
eventually, to bury Longoria.
Conclusion: A Structural Effect
The formal, overt, linguistic dimension of different forms of discrimination 
has powerful effects that both courts and scholars have up until now neglected. The 
language structure of de jure discrimination reflected and embodied the view of the 
world and the nature of reality.108 As with any discourse, the discrimination discourse 
dictates the way in which discriminated groups are construed and imposes 
frameworks that structure what can be experienced or what meaning an experience 
can encompass. Thus, discourse influences what can be said, thought, and done. Since 
the discrimination discourse is framed in the context of de jure discrimination, it helps 
to prevent the formation of group identities with de facto discriminated-against 
groups, the nature of whose composition might be more complex, contextualized, and 
historicized than the composition of de jure discriminated against groups.109 Thus, the 
primacy of de jure discrimination in the discrimination discourse shaped the way in 
which the formation of "legally cognized groups" became possible and thereby 
limited the antidiscrimination discourse to encompassing primarily de jure
discriminated against groups. De jure discrimination structured what could or could 
108
 See generally Richard Bandler & John Grinder, The Structure of Magic: A Book About Language 
and Therapy 21-22 (1975) (stating that humans use language to represent and model experience); 
Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment 112-42 (1946) (noting 
that "the relationship between language and reality is a structural relationship").
109 Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law and Governance 8 
(1994).
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not be included in the discrimination discourse; most importantly, the dominance of 
de jure discrimination largely prevented de facto discriminated groups from 
participating in the antidiscrimination discourse.
Part III:
The Effects on the Battle for Segregation in Education in the States
The impact of the abovementioned effects on equal protection doctrine is 
somewhat elusive and will be introduced in this Part by examining the segregation in 
education litigation of both African and Mexican Americans. The impact is more 
apparent in the Mexican-American litigation, where the court refused to identify the 
group, and less apparent in African-American litigation, where the court refrained 
from any similar discussion of group identity. Rulings on education segregation 
regarding theses groups demonstrate this difference in impact. Both groups suffered 
from segregation in education, but while African-Americans suffered mainly from de 
jure discrimination, Mexican-Americnas suffered almost exclusively from de facto
discrimination. In terms of judicial success, Mexican-Americans were the firsts to win 
a segregation battle, in the Mendez case in 1946.110. But African-Americans won the 
war in the broader legal sense with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.111 Although 
vastly criticized,112 this decision is a cornerstone of abolishing segregation and the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. A compelling explanation for Brown's central status in 
the discrimination discourse might be its emphasis on African-Americans' suffering 
and social exclusion through de jure discrimination. The NAACP, which argued the 
case, narrated African-American suffering through briefs and professional opinions 
and court embraced that narrative,113 stressing the story of the group’s oppression: 
"To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".114 Court thus 
brought the suffering of African-American children--and through them the African-
110 161 F.2d 774 (Cal. 1947). Independent School District v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. 
App., 4th Dt., 1930), was the first case to challenge segregation against Mexican-Americans. After the 
lower court gave a desegregation injunction, the appellate court, reversing, held that the segregation 
was unintentional and reasonably demanded and thus valid.
111
 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112 This criticism was mainly due to its following ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (No. II) 349 
U.S. 294 (1955), but also due to its limited rhetoric. See Mark Whitman, Brown v. Board of Education
310-334 (Fiftieth Anniversary Edition, 2004).
113 The richness of this narrative was not present in the official decision, but it was exposed to Court. 
For a discussion of broad portions of the brief’s material see Whitman, id.
114 Brown, supra note , at 494.
34
American people--into the legal system and made that suffering intrinsic to the 
group's legal entity. The institutionalized discrimination at issue in the case also 
represented the broader story of discrimination of educational bodies against African-
Americans.115 In Brown, Court has recognized the existence of a suffering, 
discriminated-against group. Introducing the petitioners as “minors of the Negro 
race,” Court has affirmed, and acknowledged without reservations their status as a 
legally identifiable group.116
The impact of Brown was "legal recognition," as Derrick Bell states: "The 
significance of this decision is that it altered the status of African-Americans who 
were no longer supplicants … 'seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged 
members of the human race….'"117 More importantly, from Brown onward, the 
viability of every segregation claim brought into court by African-Americans was 
immediately and fully discussed. No special epistemological effort was required by 
courts to define the petitioners or their discriminated-against position. This ease of 
asserting claims was the unfelt yet crucial impact of de jure discrimination, which 
established African-Americans’ group recognition. The conceptualization of the 
litigation as one seeking equality between different identifiable groups prompted 
African-Americans seeking for equality to bring their segregation claims to court. De 
jure discrimination thus had a structural effect that enabled the group to gain control 
over attempts to reshape the educational system.118
The experience of Mexican-Americans seeking to gain legal recognition as a 
group differed tremendously from that of African-Americans.119 As this Article has 
argued earlier, the discrimination against Mexican-Americans was primarily non-de 
jure and their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile.120 The scarcity 
of legislation related to Mexican-Americans led to an insufficient amount of litigation 
by or against Mexican-Americans, which prevented a coherent and a comprehensive 
identity of the group and its real suffering from forming. Mendez, one of the few cases 
115 The Court employs generalizing language that gathers the different petitioners, stating that “a 
common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion”. Id, at 486.
116 Id, at 487.
117 Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 551 (3rd ed., 1992).
118 It is true that the aspirations and the hopes that were merged in Brown were not fulfilled; yet Brown
taught that employing social tactics on top of the legal battle is essential to initiating deeper changes to 
the racial power relations. See Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants (2004).
119 Their experience was perceived as secondary and minimal in terms of scholarly and social 
reputation, as compared the experience of African-Americans. Luna, supra note 11, at 238-39.
120 See supra notes 6-7. 
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to have dealt with de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, is thus 
unsurprisingly considered a milestone in the group's struggle for equality. 
Nevertheless, the Mendez decision blurred the legal status of Mexican -Americans as 
an identifiable group and blurred their suffering. Considering them to be "whites," the 
court said that since they were "whites" they were not appropriate subjects for 
discriminatory treatment since state law did not allow for discrimination against 
whites.121 This strategy of labeling Mexican-Americans as white was destructive to 
Mexican-Americans, since it did not mesh with social behavior toward Mexican-
Americans or with the power relation from which Mexican-Americans suffered.122
And with this rare de jure discrimination case, it is clear that a statute explicitly 
allowing de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans would have destroyed the court's 
reasoning; if de jure segregation had been applied against Mexican-Americans, it 
could have surfaced the suffering of the Mexicans-American group.
Mendez was followed by Gonzales v. Sheely,123 in which a federal court in 
Arizona ruled on a segregation claim. Like Mendez, this case was also highly 
atypically and based on de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans. In 
Gonzales, the court identified the petitioners before him as a class based on the fact 
that the regulations allowed the segregation of “all children of persons of Mexican or 
Latin descent or extraction”; thus, the court used this de jure “naming” of the group in 
its ruling.124 Court also referred to such blatant segregation as degrading and fostering 
antagonism against and inferiority in Mexican-American children.125 In later cases, 
however, where the discrimination was not de jure as in Mendez and Gonzales, legal 
recognition of Mexican-Americans as a group has not been forthcoming. Courts,
frightened by their inability to determine precisely the contours of the group, 
continued to only apply ad-hoc group recognition to the specific petitioners before the 
121 Mendez, supra note 56, at 780.
122 For extensive research on race-based segregation against Mexican-Americans, see Delgado & 
Palacios, supra note 6, at 392-95
123 96 F. Supp 1004 (Ariz. 1951).
124 Id, at p. 1006. The court declared that the group constituted a class in terms of the right to bring a 
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Another source of 
"naming" is the petitioner's brief, which had a limited effect on the court. See, e.g., Morales v. Shannon, 
366 F. Supp. 813 (Tex. 1973) (indentifying the plaintiff as Mexican-American and explaining that the 
court inclines to name plaintiffs the way plaintiffs name themselves). On the other hand, the court used 
the word "Negro" for African-Americans without any explanation.
125 Gonzales, supra note123, at 1007.
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court rather than recognize Mexican-Americans as a group more generally.126 Without 
a general recognition for the group, the group members had to reassert and reconstruct 
each time the group identity in order to assert discrimination claims. Later on, the 
prerequisite that challenged discrimination be de jure rather than de facto blocked 
many other petitions challenging discrimination against Mexican-Americans.127
Along with other factors, the effects of the discrimination against Mexican-Americans 
being de facto rather than de jure can help understand how in contrast to African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans today continue to attend the most segregated schools 
and today they are "more segregated" and "more concentrated in high-poverty schools 
than any other group of students” in the United States.128
The end of Jim Crow in the late-1950’s and the passage of the Civil Rights 
Acts in the mid-1960’s signified the end of de jure discrimination and, with it, the end 
of the immediate effects of the de jure/de facto distinction. America has gradually 
moved from the discriminating stage and entered into the remedial stage, which 
utilized a colorblind notion, whereby reason and neutrality replaced prejudice and 
stereotyping, which governed de jure discrimination rhetoric.129 The shift between the 
stages symbolized a shift from negotiating equality through difference to negotiating 
it through sameness, and the gap between discriminated-against groups has 
narrowed.130 Mexican-Americans (as well as other non-de jure discriminated-against 
groups, for example Arabs) became actors that were allowed to use antidiscrimination 
relief in their favor and allowed to gradually forming a "discriminated group" 
identity.131 The use of more flexible terms like “national origin” to describe groups 
against which discrimination is prohibited has an inclusive effect of helping establish 
126 U.S. v. State of Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971). The court referred to the students “in this 
case” as constituting a legally identifiable group.
127 See Martinez, supra note,19 at 584-606. 
128 This was the conclusion of The President's Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for 
Hispanic Americans. Kristi L. Bowman, (Note) The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 Duke L.J. 
1751, 1783 (2001) (citations omitted).
129 Race-consciousness was considered the main component of white supremacy ideology. Peller, supra
note 31, at 759-61.
130 This is apparent in the evolution of race law in the 20th-century. See Harris, supra note (88 Calif.). 
For Title VII purposes, African and Mexican Americans were considered as equally eligible for 
protection. See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977); Ortiz v. Bank of 
America, 547 F. Supp. 550, 558 (Cal. 1982).
131 See for example Cisneros, supra note 12 ("identifiable ethnic group"); Keyes, supra note 17, 
("protected ethnic minority group"). On the refusal of lower courts to consider race and nationality 
classifications as equally violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Sanchez v. State, 181 S.W.2d 87, 
90 (Tex. Crim. 1944).
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group identity for many de facto discriminated-against groups.132 Likewise, the 
“unreasonable classification” discourse that evolved during this colorblind era 
displaced the racial oppression discourse, which was a key factor in making 
recognized group as a discriminated-against one.133 Within this new system, the status 
of de facto discriminated-against groups has improved because these changes have 
given hope for recognition of the group and for full participation in antidiscrimination 
relief.134 Moreover, the Civil Rights Acts banned a larger range of discriminatory 
practices than just simple de jure ones, including relatively “private” forms that were 
closer to de facto discrimination. The Civil Rights Acts banned both intentional and 
unintentional discrimination and has largely departed from the old view of the Equal 
Protection Clause primarily redressing de jure discrimination.135 These notions have 
influenced the recognition of groups in equal protection claims. With Mexican-
Americans, in this era the group began to be recognized as either a “race” or as a 
“national origin.”136 In contrast, in the new legal order where de jure discrimination 
has ceased, the powerful effects of legal symbolization of African-American racial 
existence and suffering led to the false belief that racism ended, even though the 
material subordination of African-Americans has not stopped. Rather, discrimination 
against African-Americans has become more de facto-based than de jure-based, and 
has thus become harder to fight.137
Part IV: The Missing Discrimination Paradigm of Streaming from De Facto to 
De Jure: The Case for Mizrahis' Discrimination in Israel
132 This shift has, nonetheless, a regressive effect on the notion of "race" as a social construct and its 
vast implications within LatCrit theory. See Lopez, supra note 41.
133 See Colker, Anti-Subordination above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1003 (1986) (stressing the anti-subordination perspective as better representing the equal protection 
notion).
134 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional a 
school board's bargaining agreement that aimed at maintaining the percentage of minority personnel 
during a layoff); City of Richmond v. Croson, 480 U.S. 469 (1989) (nullifing as unconstitutional a 
municipal provision to set aside a certain amount of contracts to minority business enterprises). For a 
critique of these cases, see Bell, supra note , at 854-864.
135
 This development started with Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and became more systematic 
and widely approved of with the enactment of the Civil Right Acts. For the conceptual shift embedded 
in this development, see Michael W. Comb & Gwendolyn M. Comb, Revisiting Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective, 47 How. L. Jour. 627, 650-656 
(2004).
136 See supra note .
137
 For this effect see Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1369-1386.
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Against this background, this Article now focuses on the Mizrahi Jews, who 
suffer no de jure discrimination. As opposed to the case of Mexican-Americans, 
Mizrahis in Israel have not managed to break through the absence that non-de jure
discrimination forces upon them and they have no recognition in the Israeli 
antidiscrimination discourse. Both Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis are positioned in 
limiting socio-political dialectics: the former in the American black/white dialectic 
and the latter in the Zionist Arab/Jew dialectic. The difference is that this dialectic 
marginalized discrimination against Mexican-Americans, yet in Israel, it barred any 
recognition of Mizrahis. The worse position of Mizrahis is a consequence of their 
unique condition, where the Israeli legal system maintains the dialectic by considering 
the Mizrahis as part of the un-discriminated-against group contrasted with Arab-
Israelis, who are Israel’s ultimate de jure discriminated-against group. The differences 
between Mizrahis and Mexican-Americans suggest that considering the unique 
circumstances of the Israeli case will help to demonstrate the extremity of this 
Article's argument.138
This section examines the Israeli discourse over segregation in education and 
how that discourse made the Mizrahis as legally "invisible" group.
1) The Double Oppression of Mizrahis
Israeli Jewish society's most fundamental division is an ethnic one between 
Mizrahis and Ashkenazis.139 Ashkenazis have historically been the dominant and 
privileged group, while Mizrahis have been the low status group.140 Mizrahis suffer 
from structural injustice and discrimination, have a high unemployment rate, comprise
a disproportionate percentage of Israeli prison and social welfare population, and have 
substantial educational under-achievement. These deficiencies have been steady or, if 
anything, increasing over Israel’s six decades of statehood.141 This poor position of 
138
  Note, however, that this Article does not seek to conduct a thorough comparative analysis of the 
differences between the American and Israeli system. See The law of Israel: general surveys (Itzhak 
Zamir et al, 1995).
139 Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Taking Space Seriously: Law, Space, and Society in Contemporary Israel 10 
(2003). 46% of Jewish Israelis are Mizrahis and 41% are Ashkenazis (the left 13% are of newly arrived 
immigrants which are not categorized through this traditional division).
140 For significant writers see Ella Shohat, Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its 
Jewish Victims, 19 Social Text 1 (1988); Henriette Dahan-Kalev, The 'Other' in Zionism: The Case of 
the Mizrahim, 8 Palestine-Israel Jour. 90, 91-2 (2001); Meyrav Wurmser, Post-Zionism and the 
Sephardi Question, 8 Middle East Quar. (2005).
141 Although Mizrahis today comprise a larger share of the formally educated society, recent research 
indicates that the gap itself between Mizrahis and Ashkenazis in education has grown in the last 
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Mizrahis is a result of lingering discrimination against them, which began with the 
Mizrahis' immigration to Israel the in the early 1950's when the Ashkenazis held 
political, social, and cultural power in the early days of the modern state of Israel. 
“Mizrahis” is a social and cultural category that was invented by the Ashkenazis in 
order to legitimize the Ashkenazis' own existence, identity, and hegemony, in much 
the same manner as Orientalism was invented by the colonial west.142 Ashkenazis, 
including both the founders of Israel and later immigrants from Europe, considered 
themselves to be a representative of Europe that faced a primitive Asian East, 
specifically, Arabs and Arab-Jews.143
Discriminatory policies against Mizrahis are both observationally obvious and 
academically supported. While their fellow Ashkenazi immigrants were given 
preferences in public services, Mizrahi immigrants were subject to economic and 
cultural oppression.144 They suffered from differential and discriminatory land 
distribution and housing policy, which force them to settle in Israel’s wasteland and 
prevented them from owning private property; this oppression is still prevalent 
today.145 Mizrahis were also deprived of fair and equal access to education and 
suffered tremendous cultural oppression.146 Nevertheless, Israeli society denies (or at 
the least debates and doubts) that Mizrahi oppression and discrimination exists.147 The 
decades. See Momi Dahan, He is (Not) Entitled – Has the Gap in Education Narrowed? in Education 
and Social Justice in Israel – On Equal Opportunities in Education 19 (Samuel Shay et al, 2003).
142 Ella Shohat, The Invention of the Mizrahim, 1999 Journal of Palestine Studies 5. On colonial-
oriental relations generally, see Eduard Said, Orientalism (1979).
143 Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine 
169 (2000).
144In the words of the head of the Jewish Agency who allocated housing to the coming immigrants, 
“preference should be twofold: a. the polish Jews should be given a higher priority for housing. b. (…) 
better benefits in the camps…” See Tom Segev, 1949 – The First Israelis 173 (1984).
145 See Oren Yiftachel, Nation-Building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Ashkenazim, Mizrahim and Arabs in 
the Israeli Frontier, 1 Space and Polity 2, 149-169 (1997); Hubert Lu-Yon and Rachel Kalush: 
Housing in Israel: Policy and Inequality (1994).
146 On educational discrimination, see infra the text that shortly follows. On cultural repression, see 
Shohat, supra note 140.
147It wasn't until the late 90s that Ehud Barak, then the leader of the traditional Ashkenazi hegemony 
party Ma'arach, asked for the Mizrachim's forgiveness for all their suffering. But this act was 
considered to be a pre-elective strategy rather than a sincere quest for forgiveness; his apology was 
general and ambiguous and it wasn't admissive of guilt or suggestive of correction, but rather was an 
attempt to ask the Mizrahim to join the party. However, although partial and minimal, Barak's apology 
resulted in angry responses on behalf of Ashkenazim who considered it an admission of something that 
had never happened. Another interesting example of the political blurring of the discrimination is 
evident in the analysis of the political platform of the Knesset parties in 1996. None of them explicitly 
addressed the Mizrahi issue, except for vaguely mentioning the "ethnic" equality by one left party. The 
only party that overtly addressed the issue was "Shas", a Mizrahi-based party that called for the revival 
of Mizrahi pride. For the unique phenomenon that Shas constitutes in Israeli politics, see Gad Barzilai, 
Communities and Law – Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities, 260-278 (2003).                                                                                                                                              
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ill situation of the Mizrahis is often rationalized as resulting from differences in merit 
or on immigration difficulties.148 The most institutionalized rationalization is the 
"crisis of modernization" from which the Mizrahis allegedly suffer when they moved 
from what is perceived as the barbarian-like Arab culture into the "modern" European 
culture represented by the Ashkenazi population. Thus, the Ashkenazi adopted 
measures to modernize the Mizrahis, such as special segregated education and low 
quality employment.149 These measures ended up creating an informal but still present 
system of segregation and discrimination between the Mizrahis and Ashkenazis. 
In one of the rare discussions of the Mizrahi group in the Israeli legal 
discourse, a Mizrahi scholar has observes:150
What were the legal manifestations of the status of Mizrahi Jews? The issue is 
much more subtle than that of the status of Israeli Arabs or women. In the case 
of Arabs and women, explicit legal norms discriminated or at least recognized 
differences. With regard to the Mizrahim, Israeli law appears to have been 
blind. Formally they have been treated as equal…
A review of Israeli statutes and documented judicial decisions supports this argument, 
since no legal actor has ever explicitly or formally categorized the “Mizrahi” as a 
group with an independent identity and independent challenges.151 Although this 
conclusion fits well with the absence of a Mizrahi group in Israeli culture,152 the 
148 Pnina Lahav, (Forum) Assesing the Field. New Departures in Israel Legal History, Part Three: A 
"Jewish State . . . to Be Known as the State of Israel": Notes on Israeli Legal Historiography, 19 Law 
& Hist. Rev. 387, 414 (2001). Although it is true that some of the newly arrived Russian immigrants 
suffered economic hardship, that hardship does not exist to the same extent as the hardship suffered by 
the poorest Mizrahim. Moreover, as opposed to the Mizrahim's static position, the transitional position 
of Russian immigrants suggests that they have a high prospect of acquiring a satisfactory status in 
Israeli society. See Michael Schulz, Israel Between Conflict and Accommodation: The Transformation 
of Collective Identities 107 (Diss. Thesis, Goteburg University, 1996). Russian immigrants enjoy the 
Ashkenazi networking. Their transitional position is part of a natural and well-known immigration 
absorption difficulties that all immigrants usually suffer. In contrast to the impression shared by many, 
this group became fairly well-integrated in Israeli society and is relatively better integrated in 
comparison to Mizrahim or Ethiopian Jews. Id, at 157.
149 This myth had, of course, no support. Many of the Morrocan Jews, for example, who were 
considered as the most inferior of the Mizrahim, were shocked to find how underdeveloped Israel was 
when they immigrated. Another example is the Yemenis, almost all of whom came from a very strict 
educational culture and were "Thora" and "Thalmud" learned persons. Ella Shohat, supra note .
150 Lahav, supra note 148, id.
151 A rare use of the Mizrahi categorization was used during the holding down of Mizrahim's riots in 
the 60’s, where a judge addressed one of the rebel leaders saying that "Morroccans should be twice 
penalized” just for being a Morrocan. See Sami Shalom Chetrit, The Mizrahi Struggle in Israel: 
Between Oppression and Liberation Identification and Alternative 1948-2003 104-5 (2004). 
152 Dahan-Kalev describes the way the erasure of Mizrahi knowledge and cultural expression--silencing 
and removing it from the Israeli conscious and textbooks--created a second generation with dependant 
and frustrated identity characteristics. Dahan-Kalev, supra note 140, at 94. 
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difficulty is that the categorizations of Mizrahis have been entertained by officials.153
But formally, the legal system has adopted a melting pot ideology that supports the 
Zionist ethos of one land for all Jews. The Israeli Law of Return of 1950154 declares 
the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, supplemented by a provision in the 
Nationality Law of 1952 that grants automatic Israeli citizenship to every immigrant 
Jew.155 This mechanism proposed a unifying, sameness-based, all-Jew encompassing 
de jure rhetoric; this rhetoric largely hid the Mizrahis' suffering from de facto
discrimination and has made the legal sphere both structurally and symbolically 
irrelevant to the Mizrahi struggle for equality.156
A key factor to understanding the invisibility of the Mizrahis is their relative 
position in Israeli society, where race-like discrimination places them next to Arab-
Israelis. The Arab-Israelis are the most prominent group to be legally recognized in 
the Israeli antidiscrimination discourse as being discriminated against; this 
discrimination is both de jure and de facto. The Israeli legal system discriminates 
against all of its non-Jewish citizens, but within the Israeli social context this 
discrimination primarily harms its Arab citizens.157 The Israeli legal system is 
constitutional, even though it has no formal constitution. Some statutes, which are 
called “Basic-Laws”, have a constitutional normative status and they represent the 
Israeli system’s legal and institutional foundations.158 Israel bans through a 
constitutional basic-law any non-Jewish ownership of lands,159 and states explicitly 
that the spouses of Israel's Arab citizens do not acquire Israeli citizenship by the act of 
marriage.160 Israeli-Arabs are in a unique position, where on the one hand they are de 
153 The Ashkenazi-Mizrahi division can be detected in formal non-legal realities. The official Israeli 
Central Bureau of Statistics, for instance, applies a division along the lines of Jews originating from 
Afro-Asian countries and those originating from Europe and America. So does the official census. See
Schulz, supra note 148, at 104-6.
154 4 L.S.I 114. This law is known as the law of "Shevut".
155 6 L.S.I.50. In addition, Israel’s Declaration of Independence declares Israel to be the home of all 
Jews: "In the state of Israel the Jewish people have raised".
156 Studies in identity perception reveal an interesting dissonance through which Mizrahis identify more 
with being a part of the Jewish people than with being Israeli citizens, whereas Ashkenazis identify 
themselves primarily as Israeli citizens. Schulz, supra note 148, at 253-56. One shocking datum 
indicates that Israeli Arabs are more likely to identify as Israelis than Mizrahim.
157 Quite different is the case of non-Israeli Palestinians. The expulsion of the majority of Palestinians 
in the occupied territories made it unnecessary for Israel to invest in the textual means of de jure
discrimination against that group. Raef Zreik, Palestine, Apartheid, and the Rights Discourse, 34 Jour. 
Palestine Stud. 68, 72-73 (2004).
158 See, Zamir, supra note138, at 6-13. 
159 For the legislative history of the Jewish land ownership principle, see Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 
49-76.
160 The Law of Citizenship and Entrance to Israel (commandment) (Amending), 2005 (Amen. 27.7.05).
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jure discriminated against, while on the other hand they enjoy an number of 
antidiscrimination laws that work in their favor in "civil" contexts.  After decades of 
suffering discrimination, in the past two decades the Israeli Supreme Court and 
legislature have demonstrated a gradual willingness to apply antidiscrimination rules 
and affirmative actions to benefit Arab-Israelis.161 In this remedial stage, Arab-Israelis 
are nevertheless still largely de jure discriminated-against, as the abovementioned 
statutes shows.162 As a result, unlike America's efforts to eliminate the alienation of 
non-white communities by adopting a colorblind consciousness during the remedial 
stage, in Israel the Arabs are treated as fundamentally different from Jews even at the 
remedial stage.
2) Segregation and Integration in Israel between De Jure and De Facto
In Israel, the Mizrahi minority has suffered from segregation, mainly in 
education and in residency. This segregation has played and continues to play a 
central role in shaping the Mizrahis' poor social condition. But this segregation was 
not administered through an explicit de jure system but rather through informal 
decisions and actions in a way that had a crucial impact on the structure of the 
Mizrahis' battle for equality. 
In the early 1970’s, the Israeli government, aware of the de facto segregation 
against Mizrahis in education, decided to adopt a correctional “integration in 
education” plan for Mizrahis and Ashkenazis.163 It was only then, at what might be 
identified as the beginning of the remedial stage, that the first legal petitions about 
segregation in education begun. However, these petitions were advanced exclusively
by Ashkenazis who opposed the plan. An Israeli scholar noted this exclusivity 
suggested that it resulted from the low accessibility the poor Mizrahi population had 
161 See, e.g., The Association for Human Rights in Israel v. Israeli Government, 55(v) P.D. 15 
(demanding affirmative actions in favor of Arab-Israelies in all governmental and quasi-governmental 
entities); Adalah Organization v. the minister of religious affairs, 52(v) P.D. 167 (ordering the Ministry 
of Religions to reallocate its budget more equally between Jews and Arab-Israelis).
162 Courts and the legislature limit, nonetheless, other rights of Israeli-Arabs in "civil" arenas, where a 
threat to the Jewish characteristics of Israel is posed. For example, in the years 2000 and 2001, the 
Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) rejected initiatives to statutorily declare the full equality of the Arab 
minority citizens in Israel. The Supreme Court has also declined to give the Arabic language a formal 
and institutional status alongside the Hebrew language. See Reem Engineers Constructors LTD v. 
Nazareth Local Authority, P.D. 47(v) 189, and Adalla, v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa City Council, P.D. 56(v) 393. 
This experience resembles that of African-Americans in America. See Siegel, supra note!!.
163 This plan was adopted in a non-legislative manner that enabled the lingering un-mentioning of 
Mizrahis. See Michael Chen & Audrey Addi, Community politics School Reform and Educational 
Achievement, in Educational Advancement and Distributive Justice: Between Equality and Equity 341 
(Reuven Kahana ed, 1995).
43
to courts.164 I find this reasoning unpersuasive because of the total exclusion of 
Mizrahi petitions; rather, I suggest that structural legal barriers, caused by the de facto
nature of the discrimination from which the Mizrahis suffer, contributed to the sharp 
differences in the number of petitions and that these barriers made it almost 
impossible for Mizrahis as a de facto discriminated-again group to cross the judicial 
barriers that this discrimination shaped
The Israeli Supreme Court has consistently supported the integration plan. 
Nevertheless, the absence of de jure discrimination against Mizrahis forced the Israeli 
Supreme Court to use a rather manipulative discourse. The first case to deal with this 
integration was Kremer v. Municipality of Jerusalem,165 in which the Ashkenazi 
petitioners refused to send their children to an integrated school as mandated by the 
integration plan. The case was heard in May 1971. Three weeks earlier a group of 
thousands young Mizrahis--who were second generation of Mizrahi immigrants born 
in the 1950’s--lead a famous and extremely atypical Mizrahi protest march (which 
devolved into riots) against the discrimination and oppression of Mizrahis in Israel. 
Although the entire country was aware of this protest, the majority of the Israeli 
Supreme Court chose to ignore the social context in which its ruling was made.166
Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court used neutral words and referred to the integration 
plan as an effort to overcome the gap between "different ethnicities" rather than 
explicitly naming Ashkenazis and Mizrahis. One Justice, however, noted in his 
concurrence the plan's focus on Mizrahis. This concurrence, though, was, the first and 
last time that a court made a direct judicial reference to the Mizrahis. From this case 
on, the Israeli desegregation discourse proceeded in a non-contextual, non-naming, 
“invisibilizing” manner. The equalizing purpose of the integration plan was apparent, 
but rather than name it as such, the end goal of the plan was described only by the 
broad and blurry phrase of an “equal Israeli society”. At first, the plan's goal was to 
merge between different ethnic communities,167 but over time this goal has lost its 
164 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 139, at 17, note 18. Rosen-Zvi claims that one petition included Mizrahi 
students who tried to avoid segregation, yet a closer and a more careful examination of the petition 
reveals that the Mizrahi identity was not stressed by the students themselves. In fact, it seems that they 
were exempted from an integrative school, which was aimed at advancing Mizrahis.
165 25(i) P.D. 767 (1971). 
166The author thanks Claris Harbon for this point. For information about the second-generation Mizrahi 
social movement, called “The Israeli Black Panthers”, and the 1971 demonstration, see 
http://www.marxist.com/israel-black-panthers200802.htm
167 For example, the plan was described as having the goal of creating a merger of "various ethnicities” 
in the school system Kozlowski v. Regional Council Eshkol, 30(ii) P.D. 449, 456 (1976); it was also 
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significance in the court’s rhetoric and it was substituted by him. In later incarnations, 
the plan was described as trying to merge "the strong and the weak,"168 but eventually, 
the court abandoned this mildly ethnic rhetoric and began to stress narrowing the 
economic gap as the plan’s main goal.
This type of reasoning embodies some of the structural barriers that the 
Mizrahis faced as a de facto discriminated-against group; that is, the structural 
barriers are that the Israeli legal system has worked to limit the possibility of the 
Mizrahis being recognized as a discriminated-against group. The most interesting 
structural effect is that in contrast to the American system--where anti-discrimination 
is designed to advance an integrative ideology-- the Israeli discourse has never 
focused on discrimination.169 The Israeli Supreme Court did not regard any of these 
cases as presenting questions of discrimination. The lack of a formal de jure 
substantiation of school segregation allowed the court to base its opinions on 
administrative and technical points while leaving the notion of discrimination and the 
racism of the Ashkenazi petitioners untouched. Indeed, somewhat perversely, the only 
discrimination discussed in these cases is the petitioners’ claims that forcing them to 
attend integrated schools discriminate against them. Another prominent contrast to the 
American experience is that the Mizrahis are largely absent from the segregation 
cases. Except for a single mention in the Kremer case, the courts have used the neutral 
and blurred language of "various ethnic-groups" rather than naming the Mizrahis 
explicitly. This misleading usage has stripped the involved groups of their identity as 
well and ignored the realities of the power relations between groups by trying to make 
it seem as if all the groups were and shared the same “melting pot” aspiration for 
integration. Although desegregation was presented as a mutual need for diversity from 
which both the Mizrahis and Ashkenazis would benefit. Rather, the goal of the plan 
was to stop the lingering segregation in education from which Mizrahis suffered and 
to block the Ashkenazi flight from Mizrahi educational surroundings. The neutral 
language the court employed when describing the conflict concealed this 
phenomenon.  
described as creating a merger of "various ethnicities and social levels", Kremer, supra note 165, at 
770; Shaul v. Jerusalem City Council, 29(ii) P.D. 804, 806 (1976).
168 Cheshin v. Dr. Hochberg, 42(iv) P.D. 285, 287 (1988).
169 Analyzing the Court's role in implementing the integration plan in Israel, an Israeli scholar noted its 
similarity to the African-American experience. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 139, at 28-29. Obviously, both 
the facts and the argument in this Article render such similarity impossible.
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Both the discriminating and remedial practices toward the Mizrahis were non-
de jure and informal. But interestingly, during both stages, the Israeli Ministry of 
Education has published internal documents using the pedagogical classification of 
"Teunei Tipuach" (students in need of special nurture). Until the mid- 1990’s, this 
classification applied explicitly and exclusively to Mizrahis.170 The implications of 
this classification were devastating, since it limited educational access to only the 
most basic curriculums, which meant that students so classified could at best attend 
vocational high schools and would have a future without much chance at higher 
education.171 The effects of this classification are still event in Israeli society today.172
During its rulings, the Israeli Supreme Court uncritically employed this pedagogical 
label when considering Ashkenazi resistance to integration.173 The Israeli Supreme 
Court's used this definition that applied primarily to the Mizrahis in an un-
contextualized manner, that is without mentioning this definition’s original traits. This 
usage of an inexplicit recognition of the group combined with the Israeli Supreme 
Court's overlooking of the identity of the parties in these cases represents the way in 
which the court inexplicitly acknowledged some existence of the group while at the 
same time denying that group any legal relevance.
One might ask whether the Israeli Supreme Court's advancement of 
integration is all that matters. This Article argues that it is not all that matters and that 
by not mentioning Mizrahis and later blurring the role their poor social status played 
in motivating the integration plan, the court declared that these facts had no meaning 
in terms of creating legal recognition. As opposed to the American experience, where 
courts narrated the suffering of segregated students, the narrative of Mizrahis’ 
segregation has been ignored, even though it was the motive behind the integration 
plan. The transformation that the integration plan’s narrative has gone through in the 
court has made the Mizarhis as a group be non-existent, and made the group have no 
chance of becoming a legally recognized entity. But most importantly, the absence of 
170
"The son or daughter of a father who is a Jew of African or Asian origin and who had a low level of 
schooling and a large family". Id, at 12.
171 A 1970 survey revealed that only 2.7% of vocational high school graduates achieved a matriculation 
diploma, a prerequisite for university entrance. The effectiveness of this classification was illustrated in 
the late 1970s, when the majority of Mizrahi pupils were defined as "Teuney Tipuach". Shlomo 
Swirski, Politics and Education in Israel 180-183 (1999).
172 For the Teunei Tipuach pedagogy and its structural implications see Chetrit, supra note 151, at 75-
80.
173 See, for example Dikman v. Ashdod City Council, 35(ii) P.D. 203 (1980); Ramat Raziel Board v. 
Yehuda Mountain Public School, 31 (iii) 794 (1977). 
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the Mizrahi and Ashkenazi groups from the discrimination discourse has contributed 
to the failure of the integration plan, which court appeared so eager to promote.174
One Israeli scholar argues that the court's failure to recognize the politics of 
Israel's geography--that is, the residential segregation between Mizrahis and 
Ashkenazis-- perpetuated segregated education "by requiring children to attend school 
within the segregated district in which they reside."175 Under this argument, "more 
attentiveness by Israeli courts and legislators to the unequal social division of space, 
within which the reform was implemented" would have prevented this undesirable 
outcome.176 But this analysis fails to recognize exactly the same things that the court 
has failed to recognize. Considering the invisibility of the politics of space in the court 
as the core of the problem ignores the politics of this invisibility itself. As this Article 
demonstrated earlier, the ignoring of this politics of invisibility did not result from the 
mere "inattentiveness" of the court, but rather represented fundamental conceptions 
regarding the issue at hand. The court clearly was not unaware of the social identity of 
the groups involved in the segregation dispute nor was unaware of the segregated 
spaces in which these groups resided. The non-de jure discrimination against the 
Mizrahis allowed the court to make these facts invisible, by ascribing to them no legal 
relevance. This irrelevance does not necessarily result from the court's misconceptions 
about space, but rather result from the lack of a Mizrahi group entity or the presence 
of a Mizrahi group narrative in the legal system. This means that any attempt to 
correct the court’s misconceptions about space would first require a correction of its 
misconceptions about the groups. The thought that it is the nonexistence of the 
Mizrahis group in the legal narrative that causes the court's shortcomings rather than 
an ignorance of the politics of space is supported by the fact that the politics of space 
do play a large role in analysis of discrimination against the Arab-Bedouin 
population, demonstrating that in cases where the narrative recognizes a group that 
the court is well aware of the impact of space.177 The court's consideration of the 
Mizrahis, then must result not from inattentiveness to space, but rather must be the 
result of choice by the court to legally ignore the Mizrahis group. Overt de jure
segregation of Mizrahis would have forced the court to cross these conceptual barriers 
174 Moreover, after decades of what might be seen as the Court's support of the plan, in the last couple 
of decades almost all cases were decided against desegregation. See, e.g., Sarig v. Minister of 
Education, (not published, 1993); Mazurski v. Ministry of Education (not published, 2004).
175 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 139, at 28.
176 Id, at 28.
177 Id, at 4.
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about the Mizrahis group identity and would have made it impossible for the court to 
ignore the existence of this group.  
Today, some signs of re-contextualization in the Israeli education system are 
becoming evident. Recent education legislation has focused on one’s origin as a 
category that education system oppresses.178 Moreover, a recent ministerial committee 
who reevaluated the Israeli education system explicitly used the ethnicity of the 
Mizrahis in its recommendation for reforms. These changes might represent the 
beginnings of the legal formulation of a Mizrahi group entity and lead to enhanced 
equality in education.
3) Segregation and De-segregation of Arab-Palestinians: Relative Presence
A comprehensive analysis of de jure segregation in education in Israel would 
require an analysis of the position of Arab-Israelis. But, due to irreconcilable cultural 
and intellectual differences in educational aspirations between Arabs and Jews, in 
most cases these two groups have been totally segregated and no case has been filed 
challenging that segregation. However, the Israeli Supreme Court recent heard a case 
on segregation between Arab-Israelis and Jewish-Israelis in the context of residential 
segregation. In Ka'adan v. Israel Land Administration, the court held that a 
segregating residential practice was illegally discriminatory. In this case, there was no 
doubt about the identity of the groups involved or their power relations. At the 
beginning of its opinion, the court explicitly frames the case as one in which an Arab 
is barred from building a home in a Jewish settlement. The petitioners, an Arab-Israeli 
couple, are presented as Arabs seeking to live among Jews.179 This case demonstrates 
the easy recognition the court gives to the Arab group in the legal discourse on 
antidiscrimination.
As opposed to the Arab’s experience, the Mizrahis’ attempts to overcome 
discriminatory treatment were advanced through social struggles alone. However, as 
the case of Mexican-Americans shows, the absence of legal recognition for a 
discriminated group cannot be overcome by activist legal work. And as the integration 
178 Section 5 to Law of Pupils’ Rights (2000) 42 I.B.L. forbids discrimination of a pupil based on her 
"edah", or socio-economic background. This provision is redundant to a poverty-based discrimination 
provision, revealing that poverty should not be a code word for oppression.
179
 Moreover, although it was not explicitly forbidden in the Israeli discriminatory laws, the petitioners’ 
national origin was declared by court to be a forbidden classification, thereby emphasizing that 
classification’s discriminatory ramifications.
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in education litigation suggested, the antidiscrimination discourse was unavailable for 
Mizrahis. 
A demonstration of this point is the only attempt to gain legal recognition for 
the Mizrahi group, which the Israeli courts bluntly rejected. In a case called 
Hakeshet,180 the court dealt with a challenge that Mizrahis raised to the allocation of 
lands in Israel among its Jewish population. Israel’s Lands Administration, the legal
body responsible for formulating land policy in Israel, decided to allocate extremely 
valuable state lands to private citizens by changing its designation from agrarian to 
urban. The allocation would have provided enormous compensation to the agrarian 
sector, which was predominately of Ashkenazi population that used these lands.181
However, these lands were mostly state lands leased to the agrarian sector without 
ownership rights, meaning that the agrarian sector was about to unjustly benefit from 
the reallocation of this public property. In this case, the court again used various de-
contextualizing techniques. When introducing the case, the court described the 
petitioners, a Mizrahi association. The court narrowly circumscribe the group by 
defining it as an association striving to:182 "fight for the implementation of political, 
cultural social and economic individual rights of all the citizens of Israeli society… 
insisting on just and encompassing wealth distribution to all social groups in Israel." 
The ellipses in the court's opinion elide the association's more contextualized and 
sharp self-description, which stated that "[t]he association was initiated by women 
and men, second and third generation offspring of Jews of Arab origin."183 Moreover, 
throughout the brief the petitioners relied on an explicit narrative telling of the 
systematic oppression of the Mizrahis. The court, though, chose to narrate the petition 
being an administrative claim to avoid deciding the case based on the group's 
oppression. The discrimination argument was also problematically shaped by the 
Mizrahi petitioners themselves as one about the distinction between the "agrarian 
sector" and the "urban sector", a distinction that risked again making this case racially 
neutral by de-contextualizing the analysis. This shaping, though, resulted from the 
lawyers' decision to refrain from using a "new entity" strategy due to the hazard of 
180 The New Discourse Association v. Minister of National Foundation, 56(6) P.D. 25 (2002). 
181 The decision no.727 related to agrarian settlements, which are comprised largely of Mizrahi. 
Nevertheless, the lands that had the highest economic value were held, unsurprisingly, by the 
Ashkenazi. 
182 The New Discourse Association, supra note 180, at 47.
183 Moreover, as an act of solidarity, a group of Mizrahi filed a co-petition. They are described by the 
court as "scholars… concerned with Israel's land allocation policy". Id, at 47.
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over-politicizing the suit or being denied legal relief for lacking standing.184 That is, 
the activists were more concerned with achieving a concrete result by abolishing the 
discrimination than concerned about striving for a general legal recognition of the 
group as a whole.185 The court, upholding the petition, embraced the shape given by 
the Mizrahi activists, yet erased, as was mentioned above, the identity of the 
petitioners and again ignored the power relations between the groups involved in this 
nationwide controversy, in which the Ashkenazi “agrarian sector” who 
disproportionately benefited from this land allocation while the Mizrahi “urban 
sector” had fewer opportunities to purchase from the state the public housing in which 
they resided. The Israeli Supreme Court in this case clearly demonstrated its 
unwillingness to recognize the Mizrahis as a discriminated-against group, even while 
acknowledging the existence of the very discriminatory practices used against them.
4) Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis: The Shared Lines of Double Discrimination
Reflecting on the relationship between legal recognition and de jure
discrimination, a simple proposition might be that an explanation for the higher levels 
of recognition given to de jure discriminated-against groups is the supposition that 
these groups suffered more. This might be true, but  as a theoretical matter the nature 
of the suffering--be it de jure or de facto--should have no bearing on whether a group 
is recognized as a group and is entitled to de jure antidiscrimination remedies in its 
favor.
Whatever the motives behind the non-de jure discrimination of the Mexican-
Americans186 and the Mizrahis187 groups are, the outcome of that discrimination was 
184 This information was obtained from two of the initiators of the petition, Professor Gad Barzilay and 
Doctor Hani Zubeida.
185 Some Mizrahi activists that this author has talked to say that this was the set of concerns they had in 
mind when considering whether to submit petitions.  For the client's material interest and activist's 
symbolic interest conflict, see Derrick A. Bell, “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L. J. 470 (1976).
186 With regard to Mexican-Americans, for example, one can speculate that the strong oppressive effect 
of de facto discrimination made it unnecessary for the hegemony to use the explicit form of de jure
discrimination. Another speculation might be that diplomatic issues with Mexico, which strongly 
opposed a race-based differentiation of Mexican-Americans, contributed to the U.S. refraining from 
using the de jure discrimination apparatus. Gary A. Greenfield and Don B. Kates, Mexican Americans, 
Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 662, 683-684 (1975). This was 
especially relevant in light of the U.S.-Mexico treaties that promised citizenship to former Mexicans as 
“whites”. Inland Steel Co. v. Barcelona, 39 N.E. 2nd 800 (Ind. 1942). It is also plausible to assume that 
the Mexican-American elite itself opposed such de jure practices, mainly out of a belief that this would 
grant them access to the mainstream. Id, at 321.
187 In the Israeli case, some speculated that "[t]he efficiency of manipulations and the weakness of the 
Mizrahis as an object, rendered official discrimination superfluous, as opposed to the case of 
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legally untraceable discrimination. The existence of this form of legally untraceable 
discrimination further disadvantaged these groups vis-à-vis de jure discriminated-
against groups during the remedial stage. Both Mizrahis and Mexican-Americans 
were subjugated by a hegemony that was not too “different” from them, compared 
with the other de jure discriminated-against groups, thus making it complicated for 
the law to differentiate these groups from their hegemonic counterpart. The legal 
system is inherently limited by the need for simplicity, clarity, and other practical 
concerns when implementing de jure discrimination; therefore, groups that suffer de 
jure discrimination are likely to have simplistic differences, such as those based on 
race, gender, or religion, because the easier it is for the law to identify the group, the 
easier it is for the law to discriminate against that group.188 Moreover, adopting highly 
contextual group definitions might go against the hegemony’s interest in making clear 
legal distinctions between itself and its "other" as a means of justifying the 
discrimination against this "other".189 This inherent difficulty of applying de jure
discriminate against fairly similar groups led to a false belief by the legal system that 
no discrimination occurred against these groups. Instead, although there was a formal 
equality, these groups suffered from substanital de facto discrimination. This 
arrangement caused the "non-clusion" of the de facto discriminated-against groups 
when they were barred from participating in the eventual remedial stage.
Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis thus both cross into the rights discourse 
from a unique position. The critique in this Article about the limits of the 
discrimination discourse has focused primarily on its rhetorical adherence to the 
difference-sameness dichotomy, which guaranteed legal and social inclusion and 
Palestinians, homosexuals and women, against whom discrimination is founded in the legal system." 
Dahan-Kalev, supra note 140, at 94. Another proposition might be that this non-de jure discrimination 
has served to strengthen the Zionist project of an Israeli-Jewish unity compared with an Arab ultimate 
"otherness", which will never really jeopardize the Israeli power-relations. In this respect, Mizrahis are 
an actual and conceptual part of the Israeli-Jewish mass, and thus in a better position to change the 
existing power-relation through a legal struggle. Consequently, they are less likely to enjoy a legal 
recognition that entitles them to antidiscrimination relief.
188 Moreover, the legal system denied attempts to complicate those categorizations, even when the 
"new category" contained an intersection of two former familiar bases, such as race and gender. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in The Politics 
of Law – A Progressive Critique 195 (Ed: David Kairys, 1990) (criticizing the court's dismissal of a 
black woman's petition for damages based on being sexually harassed, both on the basis of race and 
gender). 
189 De jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, for example, would have risked blurring the 
white/black distinction, which was invaluable to whites. For whiteness as an asset, see George A. 
Martinez, Mexican Americans and Whiteness, 2 Harv.-Latino L. Rev. 321 (1997).
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entitlement for equal rights only to "similar" people.190 This dichotomy relies on the 
concept of unity, which prevents a discussion from developing about discrimination 
that imposes different outcomes among sub-groups of supposedly “similar” people.191
Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis share an illusory "sameness" with the hegemony; 
specifically, they share the fact that they are both different from the defined "other" 
and they share the fact that neither is subject to de jure discrimination.  The myth of 
these commonalities between these de facto-discriminated against groups and the 
hegemonies is so deeply rooted that it prevents them from being identified as a 
distinct discriminated-again group that would have some legal relevance within the 
rights discourse.192
Part V: Pleading and Proving Discrimination within the Streaming from De 
facto to De jure Paradigm – A Call for Substance, Context, and Consciousness
This Article stresses a phenomenological analysis, thus it is beyond the 
confines of the article to suggest a full elaboration of the different ways through 
which the legal system should treat differently discriminated-against groups. Instead, 
in this Part the Article briefly points to the general possibility of expanding the limits 
of the rights discourse through contextualization so that the rights discourse can 
include de facto discriminated-against groups in its remedial stage. In order to 
accomplish this inclusion, the legal system needs to develop a mechanism for 
pleading and proving discrimination within the streaming from de facto/de jure
paradigm that uses a contextualized and historsized approach to inquire into the 
social-political background of the formation of a group as discriminated-against. law 
and its rights discourse are highly de-contextualized and de-historicized by their 
alleged objective and universal nature, and thus they lack the conceptual room to 
190 Martha Minow describes this as the failure of rights analysis to escape the dilemma of difference. 
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law 147 (1990).
191
 This Article has borrowed this idea from the analysis of the non-Israeli-Palestinians as located 
outside a frame of belonging to the Zionist vision. Outside the frame is how they were situated, not as a 
"missing part" needed to be reconstructed into the frame of Israeli society, but rather as the "differend", 
where the parties involved are presumed to have no common share of norms or ground on which their 
conflict can be adjudicated. Zreik, supra note 157.
192 At this crucial point, Mizrahis still differ from Mexican-Americans. Mizrahis have no point of 
departure from the Ashkenazis due to their legally unifying Jewish identity and their shared citizenship. 
Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, somewhat differentiate themselves from the white hegemony 
based on their distinctive national origin, which substantiates discrimination against them. 
Additionally, the practice of creating a symbolic “other”, namely, the Arab natives, has more strongly 
affected Mizrahis’ sense of sameness as sharing with Ashkenazis a united hegemony over Arabs. In the 
United States, nonetheless, the beneficiaries of the African-American “otherness” were not Mexican-
Americans, but rather poor-class whites. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1372, 1380-1381.
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consider contextualized issues.193 But it is only by being read against a contextual 
background that the absence of de facto discriminated-against racial groups from the 
legal narrative be understood as signifying double discrimination rather than as 
signifying no discrimination. The argument here suggests that the law should move 
toward a contextual and flexible test when implementing the Equal Protection Clause. 
Of course, however, there are many factors that go into framing the proper rule, and 
this Article's focus is too narrow to discuss all of them, but nonetheless the arguments 
laid out here do suggest at least some movement toward greater contextualization and 
flexibility in applying antidiscrimination laws.
Contextualizing the discrimination discourse is compatible with the 
transformation through which discrimination as a social construct has been going as it 
moved in the last decades from first-generation discrimination to second-generation 
discrimination.194 One prominent characteristic of this transformation is that 
discrimination is typically no longer formal and blatant but rather is contextual and 
relational. The disappearance of blatant and intentional, discrimination practices and 
the emergence of more subtle ones represent this conceptual and structural shift in the 
discrimination discourse. First-generation discrimination violated clear and 
uncontroversial norms of fairness and formal equality. In contrast, second generation 
discrimination frequently involves patterns of interaction among groups that over time 
lead to the exclusion of non-dominant groups in a way that makes the discrimination 
difficult to trace back to the intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.195 The 
absence of systematic institutional reflection about these patterns of second generation 
discrimination contributes to its cumulative discriminatory effect.196 This generational 
distinction is helpful in analyzing the de jure/de facto distinction’s role in forming 
legally cognizable discriminated-against groups. The first generation's 
institutionalized, horizontal, and formal discrimination scheme is the de jure style of 
discrimination, whereas the second generation is a more complex and contextual style 
of discrimination, the de facto style of discrimination. But although de facto
discriminated groups suffer from second generation discrimination style, they may 
suffer from it within a system that is also engaged in first generation discrimination. 
193 Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1990).
194
 For this distinction and its vast implications, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001)
195 Id, at 465-85.
196
 For these characteristics of second-generation discrimination, see id, at 471-72.
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The experience of these de facto discriminated-against groups challenges the one-
dimensional perception of discrimination. These groups are legal non-entities that 
signify the existence of sophisticated discrimination forms within what first-
generation discrimination. Indeed, one role de jure discrimination plays is to hide the 
existence of co-existing de facto discrimination, and antidiscrimination laws should 
keep this role in mind.
In this respect, this Article joins other calls to employ a critical approach to 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.197 With de facto discriminated-against groups, 
courts must adopt alternative, less formal ways of proving discrimination. An 
example of this approach is Supreme Court’s decision in Castaneda v. Partida, where 
the Court applied a substantive test to gauge discrimination. The Mexican-American 
petitioner alleged a violation of the equal protection clause in a Texas jury selection. 
Ruling in the Mexican-American's favor, Court relied on statistical evidences on the 
low percentage of Mexican-American jurors, concluding that this low percentage 
could only be explained by intent to discriminate. Although it has not waived the 
intentional discrimination prerequisite for asserting equal protection claims, the Court 
has relaxed the traditional practice that proving intent requires a demonstration of de 
jure discrimination.198 Later in this case, the Court also affirmed the status of 
Mexican-Americans as an identifiable group and on that basis upheld the petitioner's 
constitutional claim.
A critical test seeking to provide substantial protection against discrimination 
would need to be aware of and concerned with the formal-substantive discrimination 
distinction. The unique situation of de facto discriminated-against groups compels the 
application of a more flexible, contextualized and historicized tests to deal with their 
discrimination claims. Courts should be more suspicious of the harm that de facto
discriminated-against groups have suffered. In the case of Mexican Americans, courts 
should not require petitioners to prove each time that they are a discriminated-against 
group, and courts should also not limit their rulings to the specific circumstances of 
each case. In the case of Mizrahis, the Israeli Supreme Court should “name” the 
197 See, e.g., Andrew Luger, (Note) Liberal Theory as Constitutional Doctrine: A Critical Approach to 
Equal Protection, 73 Geo. L. J. 153 (1984).
198 For a flexible test that finds intentional discrimination with Mexican-Americans, see Ian F. Haney 
Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 Yale 
L. J. 1711 (2000). The use of statistics to find intentional discrimination is rare. Constitutional Law, 
supra note 5, at 524. 
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parties before it when hearing discrimination cases and acknowledge their contextual 
existence as discriminated-against groups
Conclusion
Nothing in this Article should be read as favoring discrimination; instead, the 
goal of this Article is to take a more holistic approach to discrimination and how 
different forms of discrimination affect the legal recognition of different groups. 
Being a legally cognizable group might indeed prove insufficient for preventing racial 
discrimination,199 but nevertheless this Article argues that the law is capable of 
improving the overall well being of a group. De facto discriminated-against groups 
have not suffered the same wrongs that de jure discriminated-against groups have 
suffered; nevertheless, a group's status as being de facto discriminated-against is very 
important for determining a group's position. This importance is particularly salient in 
the remedial stage, since the entitlement to legal relief is affected by the existence of 
de jure discrimination and groups that suffer primarily from de facto discrimination 
are unable to take advantage of these remedial mechanisms. This Article has tried to 
illuminate the phenomenology through which these groups have generated their 
identities and have followed different paths in the remedial legal system based on the 
different forms of discrimination they suffered. 
In determining the scope of the eligibility of a de facto discriminated group for 
antidiscrimination relief, courts should keep in mind the fact that the position of de
facto discriminated-against groups is a case study on the foolishness of believing that 
what we see in the law is all that exists.
199 See Volokh, supra note 96, at 314. Volokh warns against the looseness of the strict scrutiny 
standard, which might fail to protect against some discriminatory practices. 
